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I. INTRODUCTION:
PLAIN MEANING: TRADITIONAL, DOMINANT, UBIQUITOUS
BUT STILL INSUFFICIENTLY EXPLAINED AND UNDER-THEORIZED
The term "plain meaning," as well as its cousins "ordinary" meaning,
"clear" text, "unambiguous language," and the like have been with us for
decades, perhaps even centuries. But both legal decisions and commenta-
tors nonetheless continue to lack a uniformly clear ("plain," if you will)
understanding of the concept. Notwithstanding this lack of uniformity,
the plain meaning approach not only persists but has recently attracted
increased attention in the wake of the American Law Institute's Restate-
ment of the Law of Liability Insurance ("RLLI"), which both endorses a
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"plain-meaning" approach to the interpretation of insurance policies and
bravely seeks to define it.'
Section 3 of the RLLI is largely a victory for textualists, but not as
resounding a victory as some sought. Critics regard the RLLI definition
as insufficiently faithful to the concept of plain meaning and have argued
for a more strictly textualist approach to policy construction, rather than
what they regard as a sub silentio contextualist approach unduly receptive
to extrinsic evidence.2
However, even if the contextualists had prevailed in the RLLI, this would
hardly have diminished the force of the plain meaning concept in existing
and continuing caselaw. For example, LEXIS contains more than 2,700
decisions using plain meaning nomenclature issued during the first half of
2021 alone.3 Many of these are statutory interpretation opinions but, even
if statutory and contractual interpretation could be neatly separated (my
thesis is that they should not be), it is clear that plain meaning textualism is
indeed the dominant approach to construction of contracts. As reflected in
Appendix A, a significant number of states have statutes mandating a plain
meaning approach. Although precise classification of the states according
to their embrace of plain meaning textualism is impossible due to vari-
ance in cases, court composition, and inconsistency in the invocation of the
concept, there seems little doubt that most states follow a plain meaning
concept or "rule."
But identifying the supremacy of the plain meaning rule does not answer
the question of what exactly it means to take a plain meaning approach to
the language of contract documents, nor does it explain the methodology
used by courts in discerning plain meaning or its absence (in which case,
even textualists agree that extrinsic and contextual evidence is relevant in
resolving unclear text). Perhaps the term has become merely a buzzword
or a veneer placed upon an already decided result. A deeper analysis is
required to determine what exactly is meant by the term "plain meaning"
other than what a judge in a particular case thinks it means. As discussed
below, Courts are often depressingly tautological in applying the plain
meaning rule/doctrine/approach: the meaning of insurance policies (and
other documents, including statutes and regulations) is plain when the
1. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw, LIABILITY INSURANCE § 3 (AM. L. INST. 2019) (including
Comments and Reporters' Note) [hereinafter RLLI].
2. The debate over Section 3 as far from the only controversy involved in the development
of the RLLI, which featured vigorous debate between insurer and policyholder advocates. See
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Hard Battles over Soft Law, 69 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 605 (2021).
3. A search date limited to 2021 with the single search term of "plain meaning," conducted
July 24,2021, produced 2,754 responsive citations, 276 of which were decided in July, leaving
a total of 2,478 for the first half of the year. If "ordinary meaning" and "clear meaning" are
included in the search, the number of cases jumps to nearly 4,000.
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court says it is. And meaning is plain when a court is confident that its
understanding of a term's meaning is the only reasonable one.
As a review of caselaw reflects, courts generally do not "unpack" their
reasoning in reaching conclusions as to the plain meaning of text. Although
judicial determinations are almost certainly influenced by sub silentio con-
textual factors such as the document in question (e.g., statute, contract,
letter), the judge's own background (linguistic and otherwise), experience,
jurisprudence, ideology, and circumstances surrounding an insurance or
other dispute, these factors almost never are expressly discussed by courts
applying a plain meaning rationale to decide a case.
The inability to adequately describe how to determine "plain meaning"
may result not from intellectual failure or lack of effort, but because the
task itself admits of no satisfactory answer. Rather than accepting this real-
ity as an inherent drawback of an otherwise efficacious doctrine, bench and
bar would be better off endorsing a broader contextual approach akin to
that applied by the Second Contracts Restatement and California courts,
which is relatively receptive to non-textual indicators of meaning. As dis-
cussed below, courts already lean away from or even dodge plain meaning
textualism to avoid problematic or absurd outcomes, but typically do so
without expressly acknowledging their case-by-case rejection of the plain
meaning approach. In addition to providing greater transparency, express
acknowledgment and appreciation of extra-textual interpretative factors
would be, contrary to the arguments made by textualists, at least as effec-
tive as the textualist approach in restraining application of a judge's per-
sonal preferences.
II. PLAIN MEANING SYNTHESIZED SORT OF
A. Deciphering Secondary Sources and Separating Plain Meaning Textualism
from Kindred Concepts
Courts divide over their approach to contract interpretation and the role of
extra-textual evidence of contract meaning. Even determining the prevail-
ing rule in a particular jurisdiction can be difficult. For example, in Nevada
one can find precedent hat seems consistent with the contextual approach4
4. See, e.g., Galardi v. Naples Polaris, LLL, 301 P.3d 364 (Nev. 2013) (even though contract
text found to be unambiguous, trial court did not err by considering trade usage and industry
custom in construing provision); Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 252 P.3d 668 (Nev.
2011) (refusing to give broad or literal reading to earth movement exclusion in homeowner's
policy and finding term ambiguous in light of context); Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Butch Lewis
Prods., 808 P.2d 919, 922 (Nev. 1991) (approving jury instruction permitting consideration
of "all of the circumstances leading to the contract, such as negotiations and statements to
the parties"); Moore v. Prindle, 391 P.2d 352, 354 (Nev. 1964) (endorsing practical construc-
tion of contracts where the interpretation of the parties reflected by their conduct is "always
persuasive, if not conclusive") (citation omitted).
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of the ALI's Second Contracts Restatement as well as precedent that takes
a more decidedly textualist approach resistant to consideration of informa-
tion outside the four corners of the contract documents.6
Many commentators have summarized the plain meaning approach in
ways that are essentially unified on the core concept but become increas-
ingly less helpful when applied to particular cases in light of judicial
variance (among jurisdictions) and inconsistency (within jurisdictions)
regarding application of the concept. The search for the meaning of plain
meaning-in both secondary sources and in caselaw-is also complicated
by a tendency to co-mingle the concepts of ambiguity, context, extrinsic
evidence, the parol evidence rule, along with the acceptable hierarchy and
boundaries of the tools used for supplementing textual analysis.
For example, one leading treatise (my personal favorite despite its age
and one that I assign in first-year Contracts) is informative but, to a degree,
it mashes its discussion of plain meaning into its discussion of the parole
evidence rule.7 While not necessarily "wrong," neither is this combination
and categorization required. What constitutes acceptable material for con-
sideration of contact meaning in the parol evidence rule context is different
than consideration of information other than document text when deter-
mining the meaning and legal consequences of the text.
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS (AM. L. INST. 1981) [hereinafter R2K].
6. See, e.g., William v. United Parcel Servs., 302 P.3d 1144,1147 (Nev. 2013) ("When a stat-
ute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words")
(quoting Cromer v. Wilson, 225 P.3d 788, 790 (Nev. 2010) ("In the absence of an ambiguity,
we do not resort to other sources, such as legislative history.")); Kaldi v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
21 P.3d 16, 21 (Nev. 2001) (noting that where "a written contract is clear and unambiguous
on its face, extraneous evidence cannot be introduced to explain its meaning") (quoting Geo.
B. Smith Chem. v. Simon, 555 P.2d 216, 216 (Nev. 1976)); Siggelkow v. Phoenix Ins. Co.,
846 P.2d 303, 304 (Nev. 1993) (contract terms should be "viewed in their plain, ordinary and
popular sense"); Reno Club v. Young Inv. Co., 182 P.2d 1001, 1015-16 (Nev. 1947) (in the
absence of clear evidence of a different intention, words must be presumed to have been used
in their ordinary sense, and given the meaning usually and ordinarily attributed to them; find-
ing option agreement to be "in ordinary and plain language" with a "meaning [that] seems
clear"); see also Nevada State Democratic Party v. Nevada Republican Party, 256 P.3d 1, 4
(Nev. 2011) ("[W]hen a statute is facially clear, a court should not go beyond its language in
determining its meaning."); Lowe Enters. Residential Ptnrs., L.P. v. District Court, 40 P.3d
405, 412 (Nev. 2002) (noting that where statute's language is "plain and unambiguous" and
"its meaning clear and unmistakable," there "is no room for construction" or consideration
of material beyond the statutory language itself. But where a statute is ambiguous, the plain
meaning rule has no application); Nev. Mining Ass'n v. Erdoes, 26 P.3d 753, 758 (Nev. 2001)
(using "clear statement of [legislative] intent" to resolve "any ambiguity inherent" in statu-
tory language at issue regarding meaning of "120 calendar days" following commencement
of legislative session for determining deadline for conclusion of session; adjusting for daylight
savings time to conclude that two bills were enacted before expiration of session).
7. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 7.6-7.13 (4th ed. 2004); see also RLLI, supra note
1, § 3, cmt. I (distinguishing parol evidence analysis from plain meaning interpretation by
noting that "[a]lthough the plain-meaning rule applied in insurance-law cases and the parol-
evidence rule have underlying conceptual similarities, the two rules are not identical").
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Courts (and lawyers generally) tend to erroneously equate the terms
"parol evidence," "extrinsic evidence," and "context" or "contextual evi-
dence" or "information." Parol evidence, properly understood, refers only
to evidence of pre-contract discussions proffered to vary the written terms
of the contract documents ultimately accepted ("agreed" to) by the parties.
The idea behind the parol evidence rule is that a party dissatisfied with
some aspect of the memorialized contract should not be able to contradict
the written terms of the deal by arguing that they are inaccurate based on
conversations that took place prior to finalization of the memorialization.
Unless the policyholder can avoid the parol evidence rule through one
of its recognized exceptions (e.g., promissory or equitable estoppel, evi-
dence negating an integration clause, concessions of non-integration by
the opposing party), pre-memorialization discussion is not admissible
unless the contractual language is sufficiently ambiguous on its face. In that
circumstance, courts view such additional information as not contradicting
the written instrument but rather clarifying an unclear term. So under-
stood, parol evidence is a relatively narrow doctrine as well as one rather
easily avoided, perhaps because-despite its venerability-it is frequently
criticized and its rationale (that a silver-tongued liar or fabulist poses great
danger of misleading lay jurors than hearing additional information about
the transaction) is increasingly seen as flawed.
The relative effectiveness of contract and commercial law in Europe and
in international transactions in spite of the absence of a parole evidence rule
in continental law as well as in the Convention on the International Sale of
Goods ("CISG") and in the UNIDROIT Principles of International Com-
mercial Contracts ("PICC") also undermines the purported necessity of
the parol evidence rule. An American may prefer Anglo-American contract
law to these other bodies of law, but even the most ardent exceptionalist/
chauvinist would have difficulty maintaining (at least with a straight face)
that these other bodies of law produce terrible results stemming from tri-
bunals beguiled by false testimony contradicting contract documents.
Of course, outside the United States, lay juries are seldom involved in
deciding contract disputes. Even in the jury-friendly United States, lay-
person opinion has limited impact on contract construction because this is
regarded as a matter of law for the judge rather than a matter of fact for the
jury. In addition, U.S. law has, for roughly the past 30 years, increasingly
empowered judges to decide disputes without input from juries through
doctrinal developments making summary judgment and motions to dis-
miss easier to obtain.8
8. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp, 475 U.S. 574 (1986)
(summary judgment available where court majority deems plaintiff's economic theory unper-
suasive); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (heightened burden of proof
What Is the Meaning of "Plain Meaning"?
One might therefore, limit the term "parol evidence" to use of pre-
memorialization discussions or communications of the parties that contra-
dicts the written contract terms. "Extrinsic evidence" would then describe
evidence beyond the actual terms of the contract bearing on its meaning or
interpretation. This could include post-memorialization communications
or conduct, including course or performance or course of dealing regard-
ing the transaction as well as "context." Context, in turn, can be understood
either as its own category or a subset of extrinsic evidence providing back-
ground orientation that is helpful to understanding the purpose of a trans-
action, the objectives sought by the parties, the intent of the parties, and
other factors that might reasonably bear upon interpretation. For example:
What is the custom and practice of the industry/activity/field in question?
Was the transaction made during peacetime or wartime? During a period
of high inflation or deflation? During booms times or a recession? At a
time of scarcity or market glut?
Considering the many permutations of non-textual evidence should be
helpful but perhaps provides too much data to be reliably, consistently and
expeditiously processed by courts. Undoubtedly, this explains some of the
attraction of a more textually oriented interpretative approach that limits
the amount of information that may be considered.
B. Treatise Treatment of Plain Meaning
A perhaps overly obvious avenue for discerning what is meant by plain
meaning is to review scholarly commentary, particularly that of treatises
or similar sources that have the mission of synthesizing legal concepts and
judicial opinions. While not a dead end, neither is this avenue much of a
thoroughfare.
1. Farnsworth
The Farnsworth treatise, despite perhaps overly co-mingling the parol
evidence and extrinsic evidence concepts, provides useful summary of the
concept of plain meaning and opposing views of the concept.
association with defamation action imposes greater burden on plaintiff opposing summary
judgment); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (affidavits not required for suc-
cessful summary judgment motion); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (allega-
tions of complaint must be "plausible" to avoid Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal); Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility can be assessed via judicial experience and "common sense"
precluding jury consideration of disputed facts); see also Steven Alan Childress, A New Era for
Summary judgments: Recent Shifts at the Supreme Court, 116 F.R.D. 183 (1987) (Court's 1986
summary judgment trilogy made its pre-trial disposition more likely); Arthur R. Miller, The
Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Cliches
Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003) (writing
prior to Twombly and Igbal, treatise author concludes that trilogy and other civil procedure
developments have resulted in excessive pre-trial disposition).
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The essence of a plain meaning rule is that there are some instances in which
the meaning of language, when taken in context, is so clear that evidence of
prior negotiations cannot be used in its interpretation. If this is true, a court
must make a preliminary determination that the meaning of the language in
dispute falls short of that degree of clarity before admitting such evidence to
interpret it. Can the meaning of language ever be that clear? Corbin thought
not: "No parol evidence that is offered can be said to vary or contradict a writ-
ing unit by process of interpretation the meaning of the writing is determined.
On this view, the plain meaning rule should be discarded and evidence of prior
negotiations freely admitted with no preliminary determination as to clarity.9
Farnsworth describes the process of applying the plain meaning rule:
Under a plain meaning rule there is a two-stage process. In the first stage the
court makes a preliminary determination of whether the language in dispute
lacks the required degree of clarity before going on to the second stage, that
of interpretation. Only if the court determines that the language lacks this
required degree of clarity will evidence of prior negotiations be admitted dur-
ing the second stage of the purpose of interpretation. A question than arises as
to whether evidence of prior negotiations is admissible during the first stage
to aid the court in its preliminary determination, and it is this question about
which controversy has swirled. Can evidence of prior negotiations be used to
show whether contract language lacks the required degree of clarity, whether
it is "ambiguous" as opposed to "plain"?1
Speaking directly to interpretation of text unencumbered by the parol
evidence issue, Professor Farnsworth observed that
[j]udges are fond of asserting that contract interpretation is a matter of "com-
mon sense" and that the "'plain and ordinary meaning' doctrine is at the heart
of contract construction." In its search for that meaning, the court is free
to look to all the relevant circumstances surrounding the transaction. This
includes the state of the world, including the state of the law, at the time. It
also includes all writings, oral statements, and other conduct by which the
parties manifested their assent, together with any prior negotiations between
them [subject to the parol evidence rule] and any applicable course of dealing,
course of performance, or usage. The entire agreement, including all writings,
9. FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, at 462.
10. Id. at 464 (quoting Arthur L. Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603, 622
(1944) and discussing Alaska law as an exception to the majority rule that extrinsic evidence
may be admitted only if the written documentation of a contractual agreement is ambiguous).
See, for example, Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. O'Kelley, 645 P.2d 767, 771. N. 1 (Alaska 1982),
which is still good law. See Mahan v. Mahan, 347 P.3d 91,94-95 (Alaska 2015) (litigant "argues
that extrinsic evidence may only be considered if the plain language of an agreement reveals
ambiguity," [but] that is not the law in Alaska."); id. ("We examine 'both the language of the
[agreement] and extrinsic evidence to determine if the working of the [agreement] is ambigu-
ous."') (citations omitted). The court found the term "profit" did not on its face have a plain
meaning of total revenue minus total expenditures but could also mean gross revenue or gross
revenue minus some but not all expenses, requiring consideration of additional information.
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should be read together in light of all the circumstances. Since the purpose
of this inquiry is to ascertain the meaning to be given to the language, there
should be no requirement that the language be ambiguous, vague, or other-
wise uncertain before the inquiry is undertaken.
Indeed, it is questionable whether a word has a meaning at all when
divorced form the circumstances in which it is used. Dictionary definitions
may be of help in showing the general use of words, but they are not neces-
sarily dispositive. .. "
Outlining "Rules in Aid of Interpretation," Professor Farnsworth pro-
vided further explanation by stating that:
When interpreting contract language, courts start with the assumption that
the parties have used the language in a way that reasonable person ordinarily
do and in such a way as to avoid absurdity. This assumption covers matters of
grammar and syntax as well as the meaning of words. The process of interpre-
tation therefore turns in good part on what the court regards as normal habits
in the use of language, habits that would be expected of reasonable persons in
the circumstances of the parties. Often an asserted meaning is challenged on
11. As one might anticipate, Professor Farnsworth then quoted Learned Hand's famous
dictum that "it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to
make a fortress out of the dictionary." Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), aff'd,
326 U.S. 404 (1945). In the same vein, Judge Hand also observed that "[t]here is no surer way
to misread any document than to read it literally." Giuseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1944) (Hand, J., concurring). Continuing, Farnsworth stated:
A word may be ambiguous, so that the dictionary gives both of the meanings as-
serted by the parties. Or a word may be vague, so that the application of the dic-
tionary meaning to the particular case is uncertain. Furthermore, parties do not
always used words in accordance with their dictionary definitions. Often the mean-
ing attached to a word by the parties must be gleaned form its context, including
all the circumstances of the transaction. Sometimes the nature of either the parties
or the subject matter shows that the contract was made with reference to a special-
ized vocabulary of technical terms or other words of art. And sometimes it can be
demonstrated that the parties contracted with respect to a usage in their trade or
even with respect to a restricted private convention or understanding.
The significance of surrounding circumstances in interpreting contract lan-
guage is reflected in a judicial emphasis on "purpose interpretation."
But even though a court may look at all the circumstances in the process of
interpreting contract language, the language itself imposes a limit on how far the
court will go in that process. . . . [This is] another area in which judicial attitudes
differ. [Case outcomes often] turn not only on the language of the contract and
other relevant facts [but also] on the attitude of the particular court toward the
authority of words and the sanctity of written language used in the contracting
process and toward the protraction of the judicial process that results from en-
tertaining such disputes over the meaning of language. But even though judicial
attitudes differ considerably, some generally accepted rules in aid of interpretation
can be distilled from the collective attitudes of judges as a body.
Farnsworth, supra note 7, at 453-56.
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the ground that, if the parties had intended this meaning, these habits would
have led them to express it in a different way . ... 12
Some of these rules have been encapsulated in Latin maxims that have a
special ring of authority, albeit sometimes a hollow one. None of these rules,
however, has a validity beyond that of its underlying assumptions. Their use
in judicial opinions is often more ceremonial (as being decorative rational-
izations of decisions already reached on other grounds) than persuasive (as
moving the court toward a decision not yet reached). Judicial opinions on
problems of contract interpretation sometimes resemble bouquets of such
rationalizations, plucked from among many and arranged so as to harmonize
with the result. Indeed, a court can often select from among pairs of opposing
or countervailing rules that seem to conflict, although it should come as no
surprise to lawyers that there are situations in which two sound policies argue
for opposite results. The resulting rules have a universality that fits them for
use, for example, in connection with statutes as well as contracts.13
2. Calamari & Perillo
The Calamari and Perillo treatise historically has been more supportive
of a textualist plain meaning approach than the more contextualist, legal
realist-cum-cynical Farnsworth treatise. But support does not necessarily
translate into a clear methodology for determining the clarity of text. In
the most recent edition, Professor Perillo observes that the:
Plain Meaning Rule states that if a writing, or a term is plain and unambigu-
ous on its face, its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the
instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence of any kind. As stated by one
court, "When the language of the contract is clear, the court will presume
that the parties intended what they expressed, even if the expression differs
from the parties' intentions at the time they created the contract." There are
variations. Some plain-meaning jurisdictions allow evidence of surrounding
circumstances.
Despite the dominance of the rule, there is a division of authority within
jurisdictions that follow it. They divide on the question of whether extrin-
sic evidence is admissible to show that a term of the written agreement is
ambiguous. Some admit such evidence. The more rigid approach is to bar
evidence to demonstrate that what appears to be a plain meaning is actually
12. See, e.g., George Backer Mgt. Corp. v. Acme Quilting Co., 385 N.E.2d 1062,1065 (N.Y.
1978) (If particularized meaning is intended, "surely no problem of draftsmanship would have
stood in the way of its being spelled out.").
13. FARNSwORTH,supra note 7, at 456-57 (footnotes omitted). The case cited in the previous
note provides an example of a court ruling against the contract drafter because it neglected to
provide sufficient clarity that it could have presumably supplied. See, e.g., George Backer Mgt.
Corp., 385 N.E.2d at 1065. For a summary of the major canons of construction, see ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW (2012); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
1151-71 (6th ed. 2020) (Appendix B); Edwin Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of
Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833 (1964).
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ambiguous. Although many jurisdictions rule that evidence is inadmissible to
show the existence of an ambiguity, the apparent rigidity of this approach is
mitigated by allowing a proffer of evidence. Counsel is permitted to inform
the court what the nature of the alleged ambiguity is and what evidence is
available to show that court the actual intended meaning. Realistically viewed,
such a proffer removes the blinder from the judge who is formally restricted
to the four corners of the instrument. Another approach is to allow "objective"
evidence to show that a writing that appears unambiguous is in fact suscep-
tible to more than one meaning. This approach bars "self-serving, unverifiable
testimony" to show that an ambiguity exits.
The plain meaning rule has been properly condemned because the mean-
ing of words varies with the "verbal context and surrounding circumstances
and purposes in view of the linguistic education and experience of their users
and their hearers or readers (not excluding judges)." Meaning may not be
ascertained simply by reading the document. Although the Plain Meaning
Rule has been condemned by the writers, the UCC, the Restatement (Second)
and a number of courts, the great majority of jurisdictions still employ the
rule. The dictionary is often used as a corroborating source. Some jurisdic-
tions seem to have returned to a plain meaning approach after having adopted
or flirted with more liberal approaches.1 4
Professor Perillo, in discussing the use of extrinsic evidence to resolve
facially ambiguous contractual language, notes that "[i]n earlier cases,
courts would admit extrinsic evidence to clarify a latent ambiguity but not
a patent ambiguity" and that "[t]hese courts chose to decide what a patent
ambiguity meant without the aid of extrinsic evidence."" He found that
"[m]any of the modern cases, however, have abandoned the patent/latent
distinction and hold that all relevant extrinsic evidence is admissible to
clarify both types of ambiguities."6 Perillo also notes that "[e]ven a plain
meaning jurisdiction will admit parol evidence to define terms of art that,
even if unambiguous, are not generally understood."" He adds that "[e]ven
in a plain meaning jurisdiction[,]" if the:
term in question does not have a plain meaning it follows that the term is
ambiguous, that is, it is susceptible to more than one meaning. . . . It is for
14. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 3.10, at 136-37 (7th ed.
2014) (footnotes omitted). Like Perillo, Scalia and Garner take issue with the Farnsworth
criticism that text-centered interpretation without sufficient appreciation of context provides
judges with undue discretion to apply personal outcome preferences. See SCALIA & GARNER,
supra note 13, at xxix (finding that "textualism will provide greater certainty in the law, and
hence greater predictability and greater respect for the rule of law" even though "language
[is] notoriously slippery"); see also id. at xxix ("A system of democratically adopted laws cannot
endure it makes no sense without the belief that words convey discernible meanings and
without the commitment of legal arbiters to abide by those meanings.").
15. PERILLo, supra note 14, § 3.10 at 134-37 (7th ed. 2014) (footnotes in original omitted).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 138.
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the court to say whether there is a "plain meaning" or whether an ambiguity
exits. Mere disagreement by the parties as to the meaning of the contract at
the time the dispute arises does not establish the existence of ambiguity. Even
a disagreement in case law concerning the meaning of a standard term does
not necessarily make its meaning ambiguous. Plain meaning judges dissent as
to the plain meaning. Once it is found that an ambiguity exits, and conflicting
extrinsic evidence is admitted, the jury determines the meaning.18
3. Corbin
Arthur Linton Corbin took the view that, even in cases of "integrated"
contracts subject to the parol evidence rule, all relevant extrinsic evidence
should be admissible regarding meaning, including evidence of subjective
intent and any party communications or understandings regarding mean-
ing.'9 Margaret Kniffin, an updater of the Corbin treatise, takes a similar
view.20
4. Williston
In a Yin/Yang over-simplification, Corbin is often characterized as not only
a contextualist but an extreme anti-textualist with little regard for the face
of written contract terms. In contrast, Samuel Williston is caricatured as a
rigid formalist taking a literalist view of contract text and as resisting any
consideration of extrinsic evidence. The more nuanced reality is that Wil-
liston did not take a plain meaning/anti-extrinsic evidence attitude toward
contract text unless the contract was fully integrated and subject to the
parol evidence rule.2'
In the case of integrated contracts, Williston did support barring the use
of extrinsic information while Corbin, as discussed above, welcomed such
evidence, even if the contract ext appeared clear. This pronounced differ-
ence accounts for the often overstated view that these two experts were
polar opposites. The truth is that although Williston was marginally more
formalist, while Corbin was more of a functionalist willing to subordinate
contract text to contract purpose, the two had largely compatible views
concerning the use of extrinsic or contextual evidence - but neither did a
particularly thorough job of defining exactly what is meant by the concept
of plain meaning.
18. Id. at 137-38 (footnotes in original omitted).
19. See 5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 24.7-24.9.
20. See Margaret Kniffin, A New Trend in Contract Interpretation: The Search for Reality as
Opposed to Virtual Reality, 74 OiR. L. REV. 643 (1995).
21. See SAMUEL WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 31:1-31:13, 33:41 (4th ed. 2004 & Supp. 2021).
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5. Ferriell
Treatise author Jeffrey Ferriell, like Farnsworth, addresses the rationale and
policy driving the judicial popularity of the plain meaning approach and
criticisms of the approach but does not give the concept much definition:
Several reasons are usually advanced for adhering to the plain meaning of a
written contract. Interpreting the document according to its plain meaning
is said to minimize the ability of the court to rewrite the contract to mean
something other than what it says. However, the plain-meaning approach is
vulnerable to the criticism that it may rewrite the intent of the parties if that
intent was poorly articulated in the written record. Thus, the plain meaning
approach may detract from the principle of freedom of contract by imposing
the general meaning of a term in place of that intended by the parties.
[Regarding the parol evidence rule], parties who have taken the time to
reduce their agreement o writing should be presumed to have drafted it care-
fully. To have selected their words with care, and course should not assume
otherwise. However, this assumption is not always justified, particularly in the
context of standard form contracts, which may have been well-crafted by one
of the parties but not fully understood or even read by the other. Thus, the
plain-meaning rule may be more appropriate in the context of written con-
tracts that have been carefully negotiated by well represented, sophisticated
parties. The strongest rationale in favor of the plain-meaning approach is that
it enhances the parties ability to rely on the text of their written contract.
6. The Department of Justice
In its manual addressing government contracts, the Justice Department
appears to take a particularly textualist approach:
72. Principles of Contract Interpretation
Contract interpretation begins with the plain language of the contract. A
court should first employ a "plain meaning" analysis to any contract dispute.
The intention of the parties to a contract controls its interpretation. In con-
struing the terms of a contract, however, the parties' intent must be gath-
ered form the instrument as a whole in an attempt to glean the meaning of
terms within the contract's intended context. Contract interpretation requires
examination first of the four corners of the written instrument to determine
the intent of the parties. An interpretation will be rejected if it leaves por-
tions of the contract language useless, inexplicable, inoperative, meaningless
or superfluous.23
22. JEFFREY FERRIELL, UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS 332-33 (4th ed. 2018).
23. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., CIVIL RESOURCE MANUAL, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT INTERPRETA-
TION (Sept. 2013), https://www.justice.gov/jm/civil-resource-manual-72-principles-contract
-interpretation (citations omitted) (numbering of principles in original).
5 63
564 Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Law Journal, Fall 2021 (56:3)
73. Ambiguities
A contract term is ambiguous "[i]f more than one meaning is reasonably con-
sistent with the contract language."
A patent ambiguity is "glaring"; it is so obvious from the face of the contract
that it would place a reasonable contractor on notice of a discrepancy. Pat-
ent ambiguities raise an exception to the general rule of contra proferentem,
which courts use to construe ambiguities against the drafter: a contractor is
under a duty to attempt to resolve a patent ambiguity prior to bidding if the
contractor subsequently wishes to rely upon the provision.
A latent ambiguity, by contrast, exists where a contract is reasonably, but not
obviously, susceptible of more than one interpretation. In the case of a latent
ambiguity, the role of contra proferentem applies to construe the ambiguity
against the drafter if the nondrafter's opinion is reasonable, and the nondrafter
relied upon that interpretation. The reasonableness of an interpretation is
determined by ordinary principles of contract interpretation."
7. The ALI Approach(es)
Despite a huge inventory of judicial decisions that are often if not usu-
ally unclear or tautological as to what constitutes plain meaning, observers
have labored mightily in search of a workable definition of plain meaning
and ground rules for applying the concept. Judging from the controversy
surrounding the recently promulgated RLLI (a restatement of liability
insurance law), achieving even a vague consensus is more difficult than one
might imagine.
a. The Liability Insurance Restatement
Section 3 of the RLLI announces a "Plain-Meaning Rule"" for interpret-
ing insurance policies, providing that:
The plain meaning of an insurance policy term is the single meaning to which
the language of the term is reasonably susceptible when applied to facts of the
claim at issue in the context of an entire insurance policy.26
Further, the RLLI explains that, "[i]f the insurance policy term has a
plain meaning when applied to the facts of the claim at issue, the term is
interpreted according to that meaning." However, "[i]f a term does not
have a plain meaning as defined in subsection (2), that term is ambiguous
24. Id., https://www.justice.gov/jm/civil-resource-manual-73-Ambiguities (citations mitted).
25. When not discussing plain meaning in a quotation, this paper will continue to use two
words rather than the needlessly hyphenated "plain-meaning" language used in the title to
RLLI § 3 (but not in the text of the section itself).
26. RLLI, supra note 1, § 3(2).
27. Id. § 3(1).
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and is interpreted as specified in § 4 [the RLLI's codification of the ambi-
guity principle].""
But tellingly, the Reporters' Note to RLLI § 3, comment f concerning
"[d]etermining whether a term has a plain meaning or is ambiguous," although
referring to Illustrations and three court decisions upon which the illus-
trations are based, is barely more than 50 words, including the references
and citations.2 9 The cases, although useful in providing illustrations, do
not actually address the process by which a court determines the clarity
of meaning of contractual language. Like Section 3 and its comments, the
Reporters' Note refers to RLLI Section 4's definition of ambiguity, which
requires that a term have two or more reasonable meanings.
Like other attempts to define what is meant by plain meaning, the RLLI
fails to articulate a means, formula, or methodology by which courts are to
ascertain what constitutes a reasonable construction of text that goes much
beyond ipse dixit or tautology. If the court accepts two or more proffered
constructions as colorable, there is no plain meaning. If the court deems
all but one advocated interpretation unreasonable, there is plain meaning.
The RLLI argues that its proposed plain meaning approach "promotes
consistency of interpretation of insurance policies using the same language
in similar contests, giving the parties to standardized insurance policies
greater confidence that they will be uniformly enforced."30
Notwithstanding that the RLLI endorses a plain meaning textual
approach, which is generally preferred by insurers (and commercial enti-
ties in general) over more contextual approaches,3' this portion of the
RLLI has received substantial insurance industry criticism, albeit primarily
directed toward earlier drafts that gave less emphasis to text and exhibited
28. Id. § 3(3). Section 4 of the RLLI defines an ambiguous term as one where "there is
more than one meaning to which the language of the term is reasonably susceptible when
applied to the facts of the claim at issue in the context of the entire insurance policy." Sec-
tion 4 also sets forth the widely accepted rule that an ambiguous term is "interpreted against
the party that supplied the term" but adds that this is not the case if the party authoring the
unclear language "persuades the court that a reasonable person in the policyholder's position
would not give the term that interpretation." See id. § 4.
29. See id. § 3, cmt. f (italics in original).
30. Id. § 3, cmt. a. This justification for a more exclusively textual approach is not particu-
larly persuasive in a world where different courts often purport to find the very same insur-
ance policy language clear but construe that congruent language to mean different things.
See JEFFREY W STEMPEL, ERIK S. KNUTSEN & PETER N. SWISHER, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE
LAW, ch. 11 (5th ed. 2020) (presenting examples from general liability insurance coverage
decisions); see, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 555 N.E.2d 576 (Mass. 1990).
(administrative proceeding seeking environmental remediation a "suit" within the meaning
of liability insurance policy); Foster-Gardner, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 959 P.2d 265
(Cal. 1998) (government action seeking remediation not a "suit" under policy with identical
language).
31. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31 CARDOzo L.
REV. 1475 (2010).
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greater receptiveness to extrinsic evidence." Insurer opposition to Section
3 (and to the RLLI generally) continued, perhaps because the comments
to the section continue to exhibit more receptiveness to extrinsic evidence
than one would expect from the black letter of the Section."
Generally accepted external sources of meaning that courts consult when
determining the plain meaning of an insurance policy term include: diction-
aries, court decisions, statutes and regulations, and secondary legal authority
such as treatises and law-review articles. Such external sources of meaning are
not "extrinsic evidence," except in limited circumstances .... Rather, they are
legal authorities that courts consult when determining the plain meaning of
an insurance policy term, which is a legal question.
4
The RLLI further notes that "[s]ome courts that follow a strict plain-
meaning rule also consider custom, practice, and usage when determining
the plain meaning of insurance policies" where this is "between parties
who can reasonably be expected to have transacted with knowledge of
that custom, practice, or usage."" Although this might sound like use of
extrinsic evidence, the RLLI finds this sufficiently within the plain mean-
ing approach so long as such sources of meaning can be discerned from
public sources" through only limited discovery.36 According to the RLLI,
"[c]onsideration of custom, practice, and usage at the plain-meaning stage
does not open the door to extrinsic evidence of the parties' specific or
subjective intent or understanding regarding the insurance policy, such as
drafting history, course of dealing, or precontractual negotiations.""
Publication of the RLLI will not, of course, end debate about what con-
stitutes extrinsic evidence. For example, is dictionary use extrinsic evidence?
Notwithstanding the RLLI assessment, which comports with longstanding
judicial practice,38 the literal answer must be "yes" in that the dictionary is
32. See Stempel, Hard Battles, supra note 2.
33. See generally id.
34. RLLI, supra note 1, § 3, cmt. b. The Comment continues by noting that "[w]hen sources
such as treatises and law-review articles are relied upon for an evidentiary purpose namely
to prove the existence of an empirical fact then their use would be subset to . . . standards
concerning extrinsic evidence . .. in addition to any applicable rules of evidence, such as rules
concerning the admission of hearsay and judicial notice."
35. Id. cmt. c.
36. Id. Comment c uses as an example of limited discovery proof "through an affidavit of an
expert in the trade or business, who is subject to deposition, but without the need for extensive
document requests." Id.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. T.A. Loving Co., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13598, at
*7-8 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 29, 1995) (referring to definitions of "waterborne" in Webster's Third
New International Dictionary; noting multiple definitions and selecting the definition more
favorable to policyholder "in the context of this case"); Martin v. Allianz Life Ins. Co., 573
N.W.2d 823, 825-26 (N.D. 1998) (giving literal enforcement o accident policy provision that
loss of limb covered only if limb is "severed" within ninety days of event giving rise to injury
and citing American Heritage College Dictionary).
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evidence of word meaning outside the four corners of the insurance policy
itself (whereas a resort to the Definitions section of a policy would not be
use of extrinsic evidence, but merely part of the process of construing the
policy as a whole).39
b. The Contracts Restatement
In contrast to the RLLI, the ALI's Second Restatement of Contracts
("R2K")40 takes a "contextual approach" to contract interpretation in which
"courts interpret insurance policy terms in light of all the circumstances
surrounding the drafting, negotiation, and performance of the insurance
policy."41 The RLLI rejects the R2K on this point because the plain mean-
ing approach, not the contextual approach, is "typically followed in insur-
ance law" with "courts interpret[ing] an insurance policy term on the basis
of its plain meaning, if it has one."42
The R2K does not enunciate a contextual approach in any one particular
section. Rather, the "Meaning of Agreements" topic in Chapter 9 ("The
Scope of Contractual Obligations") sets forth an array of contract con-
struction provisions in Sections 200 through 229. Those provisions are
generally receptive to indicia of meaning in addition to contract text and
sets forth a number of public policy considerations, permitting courts to
resolve uncertainty and fill gaps in order to reach reasonable results con-
sistent with social policy and the purpose, function and operation of an
agreement,43 including avoidance of unfair results or disproportionate for-
feiture of contract benefits.44
39. Relatedly, one might ask: If one needs a dictionary to be sure of the meaning of words
in a contract document, does this not indicate that the text of the document is insufficiently
plain according to the common parlance of citizens, policyholders, or businesspersons subject
to the document at issue?
40. R2K, supra note 5.
41. RLLI, supra note 1, § 3, cmt. a.
42. RLLI § 3, cmt. a., April 2018 Draft at 17. Elaborating, Comment a. states that the
RLLI "does not follow [the Contracts Restatement] contextual rule because a substantial major-
ity of courts in insurance cases have adopted a plain-meaning rule. Moreover, because of the
mass market nature of liability insurance, there is value in a rule that rewards and encourages
the drafting of insurance policy terms that have a plain meaning."
43. See, e.g., R2K, supra note 5, § 203 (preferring "reasonable" and "lawful" meaning); § 204
(permitting court to supply "reasonable" terms to complete gaps in contract); § 212 (per-
mitting use of contextual evidence, even in cases of integrated agreements); § 214 (permit-
ting fairly liberal of parol evidence rule and use of prior or contemporaneous agreements or
negotiations under more circumstances than many jurisdictions); 216 (permitting consistent
additional terms to be implied as part of the contract); §§ 219-23 (permitting consideration
of custom, practice, usage in trade and course of dealing.
44. See, e.g., id. § 205 (implying duty of good faith and fair dealing in all contracts); § 208
(restricting enforcement of unconscionable terms); § 211 (regarding interpretation of stan-
dardized agreements to avoid harsh results); § 229 (permitting excuse of a condition to avoid
disproportionate forfeiture).
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Despite all this, the R2K does not shed much light on what the law
means by "plain meaning" and in its most direct discussion of the topic
tends, like most treatises, to comingle it with discussion of the parol evi-
dence rule and integrated agreements.
§ 212 Interpretation of Integrated Agreement
The interpretation of an integrated agreement is directed to the meaning of
the terms of the writing or writings in light of the circumstances, in accor-
dance with the rules stated in this Chapter.
A question of interpretation of an integrated agreement is to be determined
by the trier of fact if it depends on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or on
a choice among reasonable inferences to be drawn from extrinsic evidence.
Otherwise a question of interpretation of an integrated agreement is to be
determined as a question of law.45
Elaborating, the ALI (in the 1981 R2K) stated:
It is sometimes said that extrinsic evidence cannot change the plain mean-
ing of a writing, but meaning can almost never be plain except in a context.
Accordingly, the rule stated in Subsection (1) is not limited to causes where
it is determined that the language used is ambiguous. Any determination of
meaning or ambiguity should only be made in the light of the relevant evi-
dence of the situation and relations of the parties, the subject matter of the
transaction, preliminary negotiations and statement made therein, usages of
trade, and the course of dealing between the parties.
4 6
45. Id.§ 212.
46. Id., cmt. b. Courts have cited Comment b in following a contextual approach to con-
tract meaning, but not all that frequently as compared to simple invocation of the plain mean-
ing principle. For example:
Comment b to § 212(1) of Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) reads thus:
"Plain meaning and extrinsic evidence. It is sometimes said that extrinsic evidence
cannot change the plain meaning of a writing, but meaning can almost never
be plain except in a context. Accordingly, the rule stated in Subsection (1) is not
limited to cases where it is determined that the language used is ambiguous. Any
determination of meaning or ambiguity should only be made in the light of the
relevant evidence of the situation and relations of the parties, the subject matter
of the transaction, preliminary negotiations and statements made therein, usages
of trade, and the course of dealing between the parties. See §§ 202, 219-23. But
after the transaction has been shown in all its length and breadth, the words of an
integrated agreement remain the most important evidence of intention. Standards
of preference among reasonable meanings are stated in §§ 203, 206, 207."
City of Boston v. Pro. Staff Ass'n, 807 N.E.2d 229, 233 n.5 (Mass. Ct. App. 2004) (boldface
italics in original).
"The goal in interpreting any contract is to give effect to the reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties." Neal & Co. v. Ass'n of Village Council Presidents Regional Housing
Auth., 895 P.2d 497, 502 (Alaska 1995) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
"[W]hile extrinsic evidence should be consulted in determining the meaning of a
written contract, nonetheless 'after the transaction has been shown in all its length
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8. Corpus Linguistics
Corpus linguistics is of course not a treatise but rather an approach to
assessing word meaning through examining word use on a large scale. Per-
haps it is better regarded as a very large dictionary that provides more
and breadth, the words of an integrated agreement remain the most important
evidence of intention."' Lower Kuskokwim Sch. Dist., 778 P.2d 581, 584 (citing Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts, § 212 cmt. b (1981)).
Brown v. J.W., 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 21624, *2 (9th Cin. 2007).
A statute is plain and unambiguous if 'virtually anyone competent to understand
it, and desiring fairly and impartially to ascertain its signification, would attribute
to the expression in its context a meaning such as the one we derive, rather than
any other; and would consider any different meaning, by comparison, strained, or
far-fetched, or unusual, or unlikely.' New England Med. Center; Inc. v. Commissioner
of Rev., 381 Mass. 748, 750, 412 N.E.2d 351 (1980), quoting from Hutton v. Phil-
lips, 45 Del. 156, 160, 6 Terry 156, 70 A.2d 15 (1949). To the extent plain meaning
depends upon context, compare Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212(1) comment b
(1981) (the "meaning [of a writing] can almost never be plain except in a context"),
that context is here provided by the provisions of the enabling act in addition to the
tax exemption, as set forth in note 1, supra, and discussed further, infra.
Martha's Vineyard Land Bank Comm'n v. Board of Assessors, 814 N.E.2d 1147, 1150 n.4
(Mass Ct. App. 2004) (boldface italics in original).
The Restatement of Contracts makes clear that a court need not close its eyes to
all the circumstances of the transaction and rely solely on the agreement, even if
that agreement is an integrated agreement. "The interpretation of an integrated
agreement is directed to the meaning of the terms of the writing or writings in
the light of the circumstances, in accordance with the rules stated in this Chapter."
Restatement (Second) Contracts § 212(1) (1981). Comment (b) elaborates:
Plain meaning and extrinsic evidence. It is sometimes said that extrinsic
evidence cannot change the plain meaning of a writing, but meaning can
almost never be plain except in a context. Accordingly, the rule stated in
subsection (1) is not limited to cases where it is determined that the lan-
guage used is ambiguous. Any determination of meaning or ambiguity
should only be made in the light of the relevant evidence of the situation
and relations of the parties, the subject matter of the transaction, pre-
liminary negotiations and statements made therein, usages of trade, and
course of dealing between the parties. See §§ 202, 219-23. But after the
transaction has been shown in all its length and breath, the words of an
integrated agreement remain the most important evidence of intention.
Id. § 212 comment b at 126. Moreover, "Agreements and negotiations prior to
or contemporaneous with the adoption of a writing are admissible in evidence
to establish . . . that the integrated agreement, if any, is completely or partially
integrated [or] the meaning of the writing, whether or not integrated." Id. § 214(b)
& (c). With respect to interpretation of the meaning of an integrated agreement,
the Restatement comments further explain, "Words, written or oral, cannot apply
themselves to the subject matter. The expressions and general tenor of speech used
in negotiations are admissible to show the conditions existing when the writing was
made, the application of the words, and the meaning or meanings of the parties." Id. § 214
comment bat 133 (emphasis added).
WHS Homes, Inc. v. Traditional Living, Inc., 2016 N.H. Super. LEXIS 2, at *16-17 (Super.
Ct., Merrimack Cnty., Jan 15, 2016) (italics in original).
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contextual and connotative examples of word use than is possible in a tra-
ditional hardcopy lexicon. As described by one scholar:
corpus linguistics may be thought of as a linguistic methodology that analyses
language function and use by means of an electronic database called a corpus.
The data in the corpus are considered "natural" because they were not elicited
for the purpose of study. That is, generally no one asks the speakers or writers
whose words are represented in the corpus to speak or write for the purpose
of subjecting their words to linguistic scrutiny. Instead, the architect of the
corpus assembles her collection of speech and writing samples after the fact,
from newspapers, books, transcripts of conversations, or interviews, etc."
Writings in the area by both linguists and legal scholars have multiplied
in the past decade,48 in significant part because of the availability of large
corpra [the plural of "corpus" according to those working in the field] such
as the Corpus of Contemporary English ("COCE") and Corpus of His-
torical American English ("COHA").49
47. Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a Cor-
pus-BasedApproach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915, 1954-55 (2010). One prominent
linguist has posited unifying traits of the corpus methodology, in particular that it (1) is empir-
ical and looks at patterns of use of natural text; (2) comes from a large and fairly assembled
collection of natural texts (the "corpus"); (3) uses computer technology extensively, both to
gather data and to interact with it; and (4) uses quantitative and qualitative techniques of data
analysis. See Douglas Biber, Corpus-based and Corpus-driven Analyses of Language Variation and
Use, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS 159 (Bernd Heine & Heiko Narrog
eds., 2009); accord PAUL BAKER ET AL., A GLOSSARY OF CORPUS LINGUISTICS 65 (2006) ("In
linguistics, empiricism is the idea that the best way to find out about how language works is
by analyzing real examples of language as it is actually used. Corpus Linguistics is therefore a
sternly empirical methodology."); see also Mourtisen, supra, at 1954-66 (explaining mechanics
and technique of corpus linguistics research); James C. Phillips & Jesse A. Egbert, Advancing
Law and Corpus Linguistics: Importing Principles and Practices from Survey and Content-Analysis
Methodologies to Improve Corpus Design and Analysis, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1589 (2017) (same).
48. See, e.g., DOUGLAS BIBER & RANDI REPPEN, THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF ENGLISH
CORPUS LINGUISTICS (2015); TONY MCENERY & ANDREW HARDIE, CORPUS LINGUISTICS:
METHOD, THEORY AND PRACTICE (2012); TONY MCENERY & ANDREW WILSON, CORPUS LIN-
GUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 2001); Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen,judging
Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788 (2018); Daniel Orner, The Merciful Corpus: The Rule of
Lenity Ambiguity and Corpus Linguistics, 25 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 101 (2016); Stephen Mouritsen,
Hard Cases and Hard Data: Assessing Corpus Linguistics as an Empirical Path to Plain Meaning, 13
COLUM. SC. & TECH. L. REV. 156 (2011); Douglas Biber, Representativeness in Corpus Design,
8 LITERARY & LINGUISTIC COMPUTING 243 (1993); see also BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIV., CORPUS OF
HISTORICAL AMERICAN ENGLISH (2021), http://corpus.byu.edu/coha [http://perma.cc/N44U
-NQ8T] [hereinafter COHA].
49. See BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, CORPUS OF CONTEMPORARY ENGLISH (2021), https://
www.english-corpora.org/coca [hereinafter COCE].
The COHA is "the largest structured corpus of historical English." It contains
"more than 400 million words of text form the 1810s-2000s (which makes it 50-
100 times as large as other comparable historical corpa of English) and the corpus
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9. Layperson Surveys
Related to but distinct from the corpus linguistics approach is use of
survey research specifically directed at eliciting layperson meaning of a
contractual provision, which may be seen as a variant of use of surveys in
trademark/antitrust/consumer confusion cases.50 It differs in that it does
not attempt to catch laypersons speaking "naturally" but instead asks them
to interpret or construe terms. Respondents are presented with particular
contract language and asked whether it does or does not have a particular
meaning or compel a particular result."
C. Dictionary Definitions
Although reliance on dictionaries has been particularly popular with the
modern U.S. Supreme Court," they are not particularly helpful in defin-
ing the concept for which they are often invoked. For example, dictionar-
ies define "plain" to mean: "clearly"; unequivocally"; "in a plain manner";
"without obscurity or ambiguity"; "clear or distinct to the eye or ear";
"conveying the meaning clearly and simply"; "easily understood"; "clear to
the mind"; "evident"; "manifest"; "obvious"; "easy to understand"; "under-
standable"; "not complicated"; "patent"; "definite"; and "open-and-shut.""
This array of expression largely lists synonyms or provides definitions that
stop well short of articulating what it means to be plain or clear and how
one recognizes such clarity.
is balanced by genre decade by decade." Using data from the COHA, [interpreters]
can gather linguistic information from the date that a statute was enacted, going
back approximately 200 years.
Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 48, at 835 (citations omitted); see also id. at 835-36 (describing
other corpa collecting textual usage). For a friendly but thoughtful cautionary critique of the
corpus linguistics approach, see Lawrence M. Solan & Tammy Gales, Corpus Linguistics as a
Tool in Legal Interpretation, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1311; see also Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 48,
at 865-76 (recognizing and responding to criticisms of corpus linguistics approach based on
lack of "proficiency" of lawyers and judges with the tool, "propriety" of judicial research in
databases, "practicality" concerns that assessing meaning via corpus linguistics will require
inordinate investment of judicial resources; limitations on the observed data; and prospect of
political opportunism).
50. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Lior Strahilevitz, Interpreting Contracts via Surveys and
Experiments, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1753 (2017).
51. Erik Knutsen and I find this approach far less promising than corpus linguistics and even
potentially pernicious to the extent it is used as anything other than a rough guide to lay per-
ception of words in dispute in a given case. See Jeffrey W. Stempel & Erik S. Knutsen, Turning
Textualism Over to Amateurs: The Dangers of Contract Construction by Questionnaire (Mar. 2019),
https://coverage.memberclicks.net/assets/AnnualMeeting/2019AnnualMeeting/ACCC
_2019Conference_MaterialsForAttendees_20190506.pdf.
52. See Mark Lemley, ChiefJustice Webster, 106 IowA L. REV. 299 (2020).
53. Most of these definitions are derived from the Merriam-Webster online dictionary but
are also assembled from randomly consulting widely available dictionaries, most of which use
some combination of these terms in their definition of "plain."
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Resort to dictionary treatment of "ordinary," a term often used along
with "plain" in describing text a court deems "clear," are similar in tone.
Examples include: "of a common quality, rank or ability"; "of a kind to
be expected in the normal order of events"; "routine"; "usual"; "average";
"common"; "commonplace"; "cut-and-dried"; "every day"; "garden-vari-
ety"; "normal"; "routine"; "run-of-the-mill"; "standard"; "standard-issue";
"usual"; "workday"; "unexceptional"; and "unremarkable."
Consulting definitions of "clear" produces even less illumination: "in a
clear manner"; "free from doubt"; "unqualified"; "absolute"; "transparent";
"crystalline" and "limpid."
This is not to say that dictionaries are utterly unhelpful, simply that
they are not talismanic. Having reviewed the concepts of plain meaning
set forth in various treatises and similar secondary sources, one next turns
to legislative pronouncements, judicial opinions (and reaction to the opin-
ions) for additional guidance.
III. ILLUMINATION BY OPPOSITION: THE THOMAS DRAYAGE
LESS TEXTUAL APPROACH FAVORING REGULARIZED
CONSIDERATION OF CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION
Sometimes one can better understand a concept by examining its coun-
terpoint. Among the many famous opinions by California Supreme Court
Justice Roger Traynor is Pacific Gas & Electric v. G. W Thomas Drayage & Rig-
ging Co.,54 a case remembered less for its holding than its pronouncements
on the role of extrinsic evidence in contract construction. Thomas Drayage
dealt with the issue of textual interpretation by diminishing the power of
text alone, taking the position that even text that may seem facially clear
should be subject to having its meaning explained, tested, and confirmed
through consideration of non-textual factors. It is the case most associ-
ated with ushering in the "California Approach," whereby extrinsic evi-
dence may be used to determine the meaning of even seemingly clear text.
Subsequent California cases have shown more fondness for textualism"
but the state remains more receptive to non-textual information regarding
contract meaning than New York or other plain meaning states.
54. Pac. Gas & Elec. v. G.W Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644-47 (Cal.
1968).
55. See, e.g., Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 552 (Cal. 1992) ("If contract
language is clear and explicit, it governs."); Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Swift Distrib., Inc., 326
P.3d 253, 259 (determination of clear and explicit language done through giving words ordi-
nary and popular meaning unless used by the parties in a technical sense); Gilkyson v. Disney
Enters., Inc., 2021 Cal. App. LEXIS 593 July 21, 2021) (language in contract document
should be interpreted according to objective, rather than subjective, meaning of terms, and
"[w]hen the contract is clear and explicit, the parties' intent is determined solely by reference
to the language of the agreement").
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Thomas Drayage has had both its fans and critics. 56The opinion famously
argued:
If words had absolute and constant referents, it might be possible to discover
contractual intention in the words themselves and in the manner in which
they were arranged. Words, however, do not have absolute and constant ref-
erents. A word is a symbol of thought but has no arbitrary and fixed meaning
like a symbol of algebra or chemistry. The meaning of particular words or
groups of words varies with the verbal context and surrounding circumstances
and purposes in view of the linguistic education and experience of their users
and their hearers or readers (not excluding judges). A word has no meaning
apart from these factors; much less does it have an objective meaning, one
true meaning. Accordingly, the meaning of a writing can only be found by
interpretation in the light of all the circumstances that reveal the essence in
which the writer used the words."
In his response to Thomas Drayage, Professor Val Ricks has made a nuanced
defense of plain meaning and seeks to define the term in part through oppo-
sition to Thomas Drayage. He argues that the plain meaning rule:
[a]llows a judge, after finding unambiguous language (plain meaning) in a writ-
ten contract, to refuse to look at other evidence of that language's meaning.
The rule is heavily criticized, but claims against it have been exagger-
ated. One of these exaggerated claims is that plain meaning is impossible.
This claim is found in the caselaw opinions that students are made to read
[lamenting frequency with which Thomas Drayage is excerpted in law school
casebooks] . .. [but] plain meaning does not require that words have "inher-
ent meaning" or "absolute and constant referents." Plain meaning is possible
and occurs quite apart from reference or another theory of inherent meaning.
Plain meaning rests instead on our unreflective, public, conventional language
use. Most meaning is plain.58
The Ricks critique of Thomas Drayage and defense of the plain meaning
rule posits that word meaning is not inherently uncertain and is usually
understandable to readers - at least if readers are generally aware of the
subject of the contract document, an awareness that might be deemed a
56. Although not as insistent on considering contextual information as Thomas Drayage, the
R2K and scholars like Farnsworth and Corbin can be viewed as supporters of the less text-
bound approach of the case. As examples of criticism, see, for example, Trident Center v. Con-
necticut General Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cin. 1988) (applying California law) (in which now
former judge Alex Kosinski melodramatically excoriated the decision as having eliminated
the parol evidence rule in the state and creating undue indeterminacy regarding commercial
transactions while purporting to be "forced" to apply the decision via the Erie Doctrine); Val
D. Ricks, The Possibility of Plain Meaning: Wittgenstein and the Contract Precedents, 56 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 767 (2008) (taking similar but more measured view, supporting plain meaning con-
cept, and lamenting support for Traynor view).
57. Thomas Drayage, 442 P.2d at 643-45 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
58. Ricks, supra note 56, at 767.
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de facto but limited consideration of context. Among contracting veterans,
this view has substantial force. The casual lay reader may not know what
paripassu means but financiers dealing with sovereign debt are quite aware
of its implications without much if any need for additional contextual back-
ground or explanation.9
Although I may misunderstand or under-appreciate the Ricks defense of
plain meaning, which invokes Wittgenstein's philosophical explorations,60
it seems that at the end of the day he is suggesting that, in context, contract
text is usually unambiguous. This view is something less that hard-core
textualism that strictly views text in isolation and refuses to consider non-
textual information completely. In commenting on the difference between
the plain meaning approach and one more receptive to extrinsic evidence
as in Thomas Drayage, Professor Eric Posner raised the question "Which
rule is better?" and answered thus:
It depends on how much one trusts judges to interpret extrinsic evidence
properly. If judges are sophisticated enough, they may be able to read the evi-
dence properly. If they are not, then it would be better to require them to rely
on the writing. The logic of the argument is the same as in the controversy
over the plain meaning rule.61
The judiciary has in essence answered Professor Posner's question by
asserting that judges are superb at discerning the meaning of documentary
text but substantially less competent at construing additional information
about the meaning of insurance policies and other documents. As Erik
Knutsen and I have pointed out, this assumption is illogically lopsided, at
least questionable, and probably wrong.62Judges are not trained linguists.
Although legal training emphasizes reading and writing, it also stresses
fact gathering and analysis. Put with more snark: if judges are not good at
assessing non-textual information, why in the world do we have a legal sys-
tem that permits them to determine what constitutes a "plausible" factual
allegation, manage discovery, conduct trials, make evidence rulings, sen-
tence criminal defendants, assess credibility, find facts in bench trials, and
review and alter the factual determinations of juries in post-trial motions?
59. See Lori Johnson, Say the Magic Word: A Rhetorical Analysis of Contract Drafting Choices,
65 SYRACUSE L. REV. 451, 463 (2015) (citing MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOrr, THE 31/2
MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 119-38 (2013)
(conducting empirical analysis of widespread use and understanding of the term among those
using the term)).
60. Ricks, supra note 56, at 785-99.
61. ERIC A. POSNER, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY § 6.8, at 148 (2011) (also discussing parol
evidence rule); see also JEFFREY FERRIELL, UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS 331 (4th ed. 2018)
(noting distinction between plain meaning states and what might be termed "Thomas Dray-
age" states).
62. See Jeffrey W. Stempel & Erik S. Knutsen, Rejecting Word Worship: An Integrative
Approach to Judicial Construction of Insurance Policies, 90 U. CINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
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This is not to say that judges are necessary "bad" at textual construction.
My modest point is that it is contradictory for defenders of a strict plain
meaning approach to contend that judges are master interpreters of the
face of a text but that it is risky to allow them to process other information
about document meaning. More realistically, judges are roughly equally
skilled at both tasks. In any event, the legal system regularly entrusts them
to use both skillsets outside of this specific context, which of course contra-
dicts the textualist notion that it is unduly risky to allow judges to consider
anything but the text of statutes and contract documents.
Similarly, the risk of a judge engaging in nakedly result-oriented "activ-
ism" can be as easily accomplished through semantics as the sifting of
extra-textual information. Contrary to the textualist canard, a judge assess-
ing additional information as well as the naked text of a document has
less freedom to elevate personal preferences over the demands of law or
contract. Facts are stubborn things.63 Words are more malleable. Or at
least reaction to words is malleable and far less constrained than textualists
admit. Consequently, both strict textual analysis and contextual assessment
should be seen as legitimate judicial activity when faced with construing an
insurance policy, other contract, or statute.
A logical but overstated justification for plain meaning and textualism
generally is that the approach conserves judicial resources. Perhaps. But
absent the type of "inside chambers" study that courts will probably never
permit, it is difficult to determine whether the time judges and staff spent on
textual analysis could be more efficiently deployed examining other indicia
of meaning. In addition, in an adversary system, courts are not required to
make sua sponte expeditions in search of contextual evidence. Lawyers must
bring such material to the attention of the court in a form capable of court
analysis. At that point, the judicial task is not materially more onerous or
time-consuming than isolated textual analysis. Access to such information
can in fact facilitate faster, more efficient decision-making by clarifying the
63. The statement is often attributed to John Adams and was purportedly said in his clos-
ing argument defending British soldiers accused of criminally firing upon the crowd in the
infamous "Boston Massacre." But others contend that the statement and observation predate
Adams. Today, of course, the aphorism is in wide use by politicians, policymakers, and com-
mentators. Recent political polarization in the United States, where a sizeable portion of
the population disputes results of the 2020 presidential election, suggests some unfortunate
infirmity in the venerable quote.
For purposes of this article and legal analysis generally, my position is that there are indeed
established facts surrounding the design and purchase of insurance policies, for example:
What was the purpose and objective of the sale? Why did the insurer include or delete par-
ticular policy language? What did the drafter envision would be the effect of an endorsement?
Are there explanatory materials? Who wrote them and why? What do they say? What was
the understanding of a term by insurers and policyholders generally? What was the specific
understanding of the disputants in a coverage case? Although the facts may be disputed, they
are subject to judicial determination, something courts do at least as well as they interpret text.
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situation and encouraging decisions that are less likely to be reversed by
appellate judges that may have a different reaction than the trial judge to
disputed words in isolation.
To the extent that Knutsen and I (and Traynor, Farnsworth, Corbin and
others with whom we claim kinship) are correct, this argues for embracing
a contextual rather than textualist approach to determining word mean-
ing. But as reflected in the next section, this is unlikely to happen anytime
soon. In the 40 years since publication of the R2K, contract (and statutory)
jurisprudence has trended more textual. The New York approach domi-
nates the California approach-but not by as wide a margin as commonly
supposed. Further, as reflected in Section 3 of the RLLI and many court
decisions applying the plain meaning approach, plain meaning does not
necessarily mean hyper-literal textualism.
IV. A TENTATIVE PLAIN MEANING SCORECARD:
THE CALIFORNIA/NEW YORK DIVIDE
Although plain meaning is the dominant judicial approach to construction
of statutes, regulations, contracts and insurance policies, there are signifi-
cant elements of the profession, particularly the academic community, that
reject narrow textualism and advocate rather extensive (but not boundless)
consideration of extrinsic and contextual evidence.64 Using New York and
64. As well as significant elements of the legal community favoring substantial modifica-
tion of the traditional contract model, at least as respects insurance policies. The most obvious
is support for a strong version of the reasonable expectations approach to policy construc-
tion in which a policyholders objectively reasonable expectations determine contract meaning
even if contradicted by the literal language of the policy. See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL & ERIK S.
KNUTSEN, STEMPEL & KNUTSEN ON INSURANCE COVERAGE, § 4.11 (4th ed. 2016); Robert E.
Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970)
(Part I). In practice, however, nearly all jurisdictions at least purport to require a showing of
textual ambiguity before considering policyholder expectations as a guide to word meaning.
See RANDY MANILOFF & JEFFREY STEMPEL, GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE: KEY
ISSUES IN EVERY STATE ch. 22 (3d ed. 2015). Because court decisions involving the reasonable
expectations concept are so interwoven with the dispute in question rather than a broad state
"rule" on reasonable expectations, the authors of the Treatise elected to eliminate this chapter
in the fourth and fifth editions.
In addition, there is some support for viewing insurance policies as products and assessing
them in light of their performance and fitness for the ostensible purpose rather than focusing
on text alone. See, e.g., Christopher C. French, Understanding Insurance Policies as Non-Con-
tracts: An Alternative Approach to Drafting and Construing These Unique Financial Instruments, 89
TEMPLE L. REV. 53 5 (2017); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Contract as Thing, 44 TORT, TRIAL
& INS. L.J. 813 (2009); Daniel Schwarcz, A Product Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation
of Insurance Coverage, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389 (2007). There is less support for view-
ing insurance policies as social instruments, Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social
Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489 (2010), or akin to legislation,
Jeffrey W Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Statute, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 203 (2010).
This is in addition to a rather large block of the academic community that, although adher-
ing to a contract model of insurance policies, would prefer to de-emphasize textualism and
What Is the Meaning of "Plain Meaning"?
California law as illustrative points on the text-context continuum, Profes-
sor Miller provides a useful summary assessment of the divide:
The differences between New York and California contract law turn out to
align with the formalist-contextualist distinction in contract theory. New York
judges are formalists. Especially in commercial cases, they have little tolerance
for attempts to re-write contracts to make them fairer or more equitable, and
they look to the written agreement as the definitive source of interpretation.
California judges, on the other hand, more willingly reform or reject contracts
in the service of morality or public policy; they place less emphasis on the
written agreement of the parties and seek instead to identify the contours of
their commercial relationship within a broader context framed by principles
of reason, equity, and substantial justice.5
Accepting the dichotomy set forth by Professor Miller and others that
there is a highly textualist New York approach and a highly contextualist
California approach, one can make a rough alignment of the states. This
list, however, requires the caveat that the Miller dichotomy necessarily
minimizes the variance between judges in the same jurisdiction, an argu-
able ecological fallacy but also an occupational hazard whenever summa-
rizing the law of a jurisdiction.
increase contextualism beyond that approved in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. See, e.g.,
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Contract Interpretation 2.0: Not Winner-Take-All but Best-Tool-for-
the-Job, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1625 (2018) (arguing for avoidance of fundamentalist textualist
approach and advocating more eclectic approach to contract construction); James A. Fischer,
Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation? Text Versus Context, 24
AMIz. ST. L.J. 995 (1992) (supporting contextualist approach and finding it more prevalent in
caselaw than commonly thought in view of judicial rhetoric supporting textual focus); STEM-
PEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 64 (same regarding insurance policies); see also William Baude &
Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079 (2017) (taking less eclectic
view more cabined by text but recognizing substantial non-textual factors operating widely in
contract and statutory interpretation cases).
65. See Miller, supra note 31, at 1478. Although stating that "[b]oth approaches to contract
law are commendable" and "serve important social goals" as well as employing "sophisticated
and well-reasoned doctrines in the service of these ends," in a victory for formalism fans,
Professor Miller observed that
contracting parties do take a position on this question [of which approach is bet-
ter]. The testimony of the marketplace the verdict of thousands of sophisticated
parties whose incentives are to maximize the value of contract terms is that New
York's formalistic rules win out over California's contextualist approach. As pre-
dicted by theory, sophisticated parties prefer formalistic rules of contract law.
Id. at 1478; see also Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An
Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies' Con-
tracts, 30 CARDOzo L. REV. 1457 (2009) (finding New York favored in choice of law clauses by
roughly 2:1 margin in contracts involving commercial firms); Avery Weiner Katz, The Eco-
nomics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 508-11 (2004)
(positing that sophisticated contracting parties have the ability and motivation to choose the
degree of formalism that best suits their needs of value maximization).
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Not all 50 states are listed in the following classification, a result stem-
ming from reluctance to list a state as in either "camp" if the precedents of
the state high courts were not sufficiently clear and consistent. For exam-
ple, my home state of Nevada is listed in neither column because of what I
regard as conflicting or unclear precedent. An advocate can find both plain
meaning and contextualist cases to cite in a brief without the existence
of what I would regard as a definitive modern state supreme court deci-
sion on the matter. But for Nevada, as well as the other fifteen states not
listed, some observers would deem this refusal to classify as too tentative.66
Similarly, some observers may disagree with some of the following classifi-
cations. Even in New York, the archetypical home of textualist plain mean-
ing, there is precedent receptive to consideration of non-textual evidence
of meaning.67
66. And perhaps this understates the numerical advantage of the New York approach. If
under duress to classify Nevada, I would probably put it in the plain meaning column based
on recent decisions. See, e.g., Pope Invs., LLC v. China Yida Holding Co., 2021 Nev. LEXIS
30, at *10 (Nev. July 8, 2021) (court "reviews matters of statutory interpretation de novo,
applying the statue's plain meaning where not ambiguous"; legislative intent apparently only
relevant where statutory text facially ambiguous); Wolfus v. Brunk, 489 P.3d 913, 914 (Nev.
2021) ("We will interpret a statute by its plain meaning unless some exception applies.");
Legislature of Nevada v. Settelmeyer, 486 P.3 d 1276, 1281 (Nev. 2021) (giving broad, arguably
hyper-literal, construction to word "any" in state constitution and refusing to consider his-
torical and contextual information deemed persuasive by counsel for the Legislature in ruling
that revenue bill did not violate state constitutional provision requiring supermajority vote for
tax increases); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 485 P.3d 1247, 2021 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS
298, *9 (Apr. 23, 2021) (applying text of costs statute in literal fashion despite odd result that
litigant prevailing in lion's share of a quarter-century of litigation is not entitled to costs and
that litigant losing on most issues is entitle to costs and holding "Hyatt's reliance on equity ...
cannot override the Nevada statute's plain language").
I have refrained from putting Nevada squarely in the New York column not only because its
contextualist precedents have not been overruled or disavowed but also because it often looks
to California law and precedent for guidance in resolving cases. But perhaps this caution is
excessive in light of the state supreme court's most recent textualist rhetoric. But see Galardi
v. Naples Polaris, LLC, 301 P.3d 364, 367 (Nev. 2013) ("Modernly, courts consult trade usage
and custom not only to determine the meaning of an ambiguous provision but also to deter-
mine whether a contract provision is ambiguous in the first place.").
67. See, e.g., Beazley Ins. Co. v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 880 E3d 64,71 (2d Cir. 2018) (applying
New York law and finding that it permits consideration of custom, practice, usage, generally
understood connotation of words within a trade or business); see also RLLI, supra note 1, § 3,
Reporters' Note c (citing additional federal cases taking similar view of New York law).
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States Expressly Expressing Receptiveness to Extrinsic Evidence (often citing
California cases)
Alaska,68 Arizona,69 Arkansas,70 California,7' Idaho,72 Illinois,73 Iowa,7 4
Maine,75 Maryland,7 6 Montana,7 7 New Jersey,78 New Mexico,79 Utah,80
Vermont,81 and Washington.82
68. See, e.g., Nautilus Marine Enters. v. Exon Mobil Corp., 305 P.3d 309 (Alaska 2013).
69. Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 854 P.2d 1134 (Ariz. 1993) (applying R2K
contextual approach).
70. Hurt-Hoover Invs., LLC v. Fulmer, 433 S.W3d 917 (Ark. 2014) (parol evidence rule
does not prohibit introduction of extrinsic evidence where the evidence aids the court's
interpretation).
71. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal.
1968) (discussed in more detail, infra).
72. Anderson & Nafzier v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 595 P.2d 709 (Idaho 1979) (noting that
in sale of goods case governed by Uniform Commercial Code, court will consider material
other than text of contract).
73. Hessler v. Crystal Lake Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 788 N.E.2d 404 (Ill. 2003) (express-
ing support for R2K and broad receptiveness to extrinsic evidence).
74. Peak v. Adams, 799 N.W2d 535 (Iowa 2011) (supporting R2K approach).
75. Rogers v. Jackson, 804 A.2d 379 (Me. 2002).
76. Clendenin Bros. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 889 A.2d 387 (Md. 2006).
77. Mary J. Baker Revocable Trust v. Cenex Harvest States Coops., Inc., 164 P.3d 851
(Mont. 2007).
78. Conway v. 287 Corporate Center Assocs., 901 A.2d 341 (N.J. 2006).
79. Sanders v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 188 P.3d 1200 (N.M. 2008).
80. Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995); see also Marke O.
Morris & Elizabeth Evenson, What's Happening to the Parol Evidence Rule? More Holes in the
Dike, 67 DEF. COUNSEL J. 209 (2003) (discussing case).
81. Madowitz v. Woods at Killington Owners' Ass'n, 6 A.3 d 1117 (Vt. 2010).
82. Berg v. Hudsman, 802 P.2d 222 (Wash. 1990).
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States Expressly Expressing Resistance to Extrinsic Evidence (often citing
New York Precedent)
Alabama,83 Colorado,84 Connecticut,85 Delaware,86 Florida,87 Georgia,88
Hawaii,89 Indiana,90 Louisiana,91 Nebraska,92 New Hampshire,93 New
York,94 North Dakota,95 Oregon,96 Pennsylvania,97 Texas,98 Virginia,99
Wisconsin,100 and Wyoming.101
V. STATE STATUTES ON PLAIN MEANING
AND CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
Appendix A presents a listing of the states with statutes addressing con-
tract interpretation. Many states also have statutes governing statutory
interpretation methodology that could be pressed into service by counsel
83. Slaton v. Shell, 398 So. 2d 311 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981) (articulating traditional rule that
written instruments may not be varied by parol evidence).
84. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hansen, 375 P.3d 115 (Colo. 2016); Montoya v. Cherry
Creek Dodge, Inc., 708 P.2d 491 (Colo. App. 1985) (embracing traditional approach to parol
evidence rule).
85. Heyman Assocs. No. 1 v. Ins. Co. of the State of Pa., 653 A.2d 122 (Conn. 1999); Neiditz
v. Hous. Auth. of City of Harford, 651 A.2d 1295 (Conn. 1994) (finding ten-year warehouse
lease integrated and refusing to consider extrinsic evidence in construction). But see discussion
infra, regarding the Connecticut Supreme Court's 2003 move from a plain meaning approach
to a contextual approach, with the legislature reinstating the plain meaning approach.
86. Kellam Energy, Inc. v. Duncan, 668 E Supp. 861 (D. Del. 1987) (rejecting extrinsic
evidence seeking to vary text of price term of sales contract); Eagle Indus., Inc. v. DeVilbiss
Health Care, Inc., 702 A.2d 1228 (Del. 1997).
87. Dimmit Chevrolet, Inc. v. Se. Fid. Ins. Corp., 636 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1993); Lakes Assoc.,
Ltd. v. Vargas, 881 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (supporting traditional parol evi-
dence rule but also entertaining inducement exception); see also Deni Assocs. v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 1998) (taking broad textual approach to reading of
CGL policy pollution exclusion and rejecting reasonable expectations analysis).
88. Golden Peanut Co. v. Bass, 563 S.E.2d 116 (Ga. 2002) (taking restrictive view of con-
sideration of usage in trade or course of dealing that may vary facially clear meaning of con-
tract text).
89. MPM Hawaiian, Inc. v. World Square, 666 P.2d 622 (Haw. App. 1983) (embracing
traditional parol evidence rule).
90. I.C.C. Protective Coatings, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 695 N.E.2d 1030 (Ind. App.
1998) (supporting traditional parol evidence rule).
91. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2046.
92. Henn v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. 894 N.W2d 179 (Neb. 2017).
93. Bates v. Phenix Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 943 A.2d 750 (N.H. 2008).
94. Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. County of Rensselaer, 47 N.E.3d 458 (N.Y. 2016).
95. Hanneman v. Cont'l W. Ins. Co., 575 N.W2d 445 (N.D. 1998).
96. N. Pac. Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 22 P.3d 739 (Or. 2001).
97. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Shane & Shane Co., L.P.A., 605 N.E.2d 1325 (Ohio 1992).
98. Kelley-Coppedge, Ins. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 980 S.W2d 462 (Tex. 1998).
99. Salzi v. Va. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 556 S.E.2d 758 (Va. 2002).
100. Bethke v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 825 N.W2d 482 (Wis. 2013).
101. Colo. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sammons, 157 P.3d 460 (Wyo. 2007).
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by analogy.0 2 Of the states with contract interpretation statues, some
(e.g., Iowa,103 Nebraska04) are largely just codifications of the ambiguity
approach,105 while others restate basic contract construction doctrine such
as the norms that contracts be construed as a whole106 with a preference
for legality and avoidance of forfeiture.107 The statutes may also include
102. For example, in Duane Reade, Inc. v. Cardtronics, 863 N.Y.S.2d 14 (App. Div. 2008), the
Appellate Division applied N.Y. Statutes Law § 254 ("Relative or qualifying words of clauses
in a statute ordinarily are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding.")
when construing a contract.
103. IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.22 ("When the terms of an agreement have been intended in a
different sense by the parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either party in which a party
had reason to suppose the other understood it").
104. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1217 ("When the terms of an agreement have been intended in
a different sense by the parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either party in which he
had reason to suppose the other understood it.").
105. In states with more extensive contract interpretation statutes, codification of contra
proferentem is also a common feature. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1654 ("In cases of uncer-
tainty not removed by the preceding rules, the language of a contract should be interpreted
most strongly against the party who caused the uncertainty to exist."); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-2-
2(5) ("If the construction is doubtful, that which goes most strongly against the party execut-
ing the instrument or undertaking the obligation is generally to be preferred."); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 170 ("In cases of uncertainty, not removed by the preceding rules, the language
of a contract should be interpreted most strongly against the party who caused the uncer-
tainty to exist. The promisor is presumed to be such party, except in a contract between a
public officer or body, as such, and a private party, in which it is presumed that all uncertainty
was caused by the private party.").
106. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1641 ("The whole of a contract is to be taken together, so
as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the
other"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 157 ("The whole of a contract is to be taken together, so
as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the
others."); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 28-3-202 (same).
107. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1643 ('A contract must receive such an interpretation as
will make it lawful, operative, definite, reasonable, and capable of being carried into effect, if
it can be done without violating the intention of the parties."); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-2-2(4))
("The construction which will uphold a contract in whole or in every part is to be preferred,
and the whole contract should be looked to in arriving at the construction of any part"); CAL.
Civ. CODE § 1642 ("Several contracts relating to the same matters, between the same parties,
and made as parts of substantially one transaction, are to be taken together."); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 28-3-201 ("A contract must receive such an interpretation as will make it lawful, oper-
ative, definite, reasonable, and capable of being carried into effect, if it can be done without
violating the intention of the parties."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-08 (same); OKLA. ST. ANN.
tit. 15, § 166 ("Particular clauses of a contract are subordinate to its general intent.'); id. § 168
("Repugnancy in a contract must be reconciled, if possible, by such an interpretation as will
give some effect to the repugnant clause, subordinate to the general intent and purposes of
the whole contract."); id. § 159 ("A Contract must receive such an interpretation as will make
it lawful, operative, definite, reasonable and capable of being carried into effect, if it can be
done without violating the intention of the parties."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-07 ("Several
contracts relating to the same matters between the same parties and made as parts of substan-
tially one transaction shall be taken together").
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provisions regarding choice of law,108 cannons of substantive law or policy,09
gap-fillers,"0 or custom and practice cum public policy."' They also tend
to expressly recognize the importance of trade usage, industry custom, and
course of dealing as helpful factors in contract construction."2
Regarding plain meaning, state statutes, like common law, often exhibit
an affinity for contract text."3 Perhaps unsurprisingly, those statutes are
often as vague or conclusory as court decisions as to what constitute plain
meaning"4 and relatively receptive to non-textual information about mean-
ing. From the cynic's view, this is further evidence that plain meaning is not
only in the eye of the beholder but, like Justice Potter Stewart's (in)famous
aphorism about pornography, is something judges know when they see it
but can't quite describe."
108. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 162 ('A contract is to be interpreted according to
the law and usage of the place where it is to be performed, or, if it does not indicate a place of
performance, according to the law and usage of the place where it is made.").
109. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 13-2-2(8) ("Estates and grants by implication are not
favored"); id. § 13-2-2(9) ("Time is not generally of the essence of a contract; but, by express
stipulation or reasonable construction, it may become so"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 174
("Time is never considered of the essence of a contract, unless by its terms expressly so
provided.").
110. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 173 ("Reasonable time allowed where not speci-
fied" in contract); id. § 176 ('A promise made in the singular number, but executed by several
persons, is presumed to be joint and several.").
111. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 29-109 ("Where a contract is party written and partly printed,
or where part of it is written or printed under the special directions of the parties, and with a
special view to their intention, and the remainder is copied from a form originally prepared
without special reference to the particular parties and the particular contract in question, the
written parts control the printed parts, and the parts which are purely original control those
which are copied from a form, and if the two are absolutely repugnant, the latter must be so
far disregarded."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 175 ("Promise presumed joint and several"); id.
§ 178 (providing that after divorce or annulment, contracts designating a former spouse as
beneficiary will be interpreted such that "all provisions in the contract in favor of the dece-
dent's former spouse are thereby revoked" absent six exceptions).
112. See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 13-2-2(3) ("The custom of any business or trade shall be
binding only when it is of such universal practice as to justify the conclusion that it became,
by implication, a part of the contract .... "). In addition, almost every state has enacted the
portions of the Uniform Commercial Code that provided for consideration of usage in trade,
course of dealing, and course of performance. These provisions are controlling in sale of
goods disputes and other cases where the Code may be applicable. In addition, courts in com-
mon law contract cases often look to the Uniform Commercial Code for guidance.
113. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 155 ("When a contract is reduced to writing, the
intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if possible, subject, how-
ever, to the other provisions of this article.").
114. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-303 ("When a contract is reduced to writing, the
intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone if possible, subject, how-
ever, to the other provisions of this Chapter."); id. § 38-3-401 (The language of a contract is
to govern its interpretation if the language is clear and explicit and does not involve an absur-
dity."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-50-112 ("All contracts ... shall be prima facie evidence of the
true intention of the parties, and shall be enforced as written.").
115. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I shall not
today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within
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There are some attempts-none of which are very detailed-at fleshing
out the notion of plain, ordinary, clear or apparent meaning. California
law, notwithstanding its reputation as an extrinsic evidence state, not only
pays homage to text but attempts to provide guidance, as do Georgia,116
North Dakota,"7 Oklahoma,"8 and other states."9 New York does not
that shorthand description [of hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case
[LesAmants] is not that.").
116. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 13-2-2(2) ("Words generally bear their usual and common
signification; but technical words, words of art, or words used in a particular trade or business
will be construed, generally, to be used in reference to this peculiar meaning. The local usage
or understanding of a word may be provided in order to arrive at the meaning intended by
the parties."); id. § 13-2-3 ("The cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain the intention of
the parties. If that intention is clear and it contravenes no rule of law and sufficient words are
used to arrive at the intention, it shall be enforced irrespective of all technical or arbitrary
rules of construction.").
117. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-09 ("The words of a contract are to be understood
in their ordinary and popular sense rather than according to their strict legal meaning, unless
used by the parties in a technical sense, or unless a special meaning is given them by usage,
in which case the latter must be followed."); id. § 9-07-10 ("Technical words are to be inter-
preted as usually understood by person in the profession or business to which they relate,
unless clearly used in a different sense."); id. § 9-07-12 ("A contract may be explained by ref-
erence to the circumstances under which it was made and the matter to which it relates."); id.
§ 9-07-13 ("However broad may be the terms of a contact, it extends only to those things con-
cerning which it appears that the parties intended to contract."); id. § 9-07-14 ("If the terms
of a promise in any respect are ambiguous or uncertain, it must be interpreted in the sense
in which the promisor believed at the time of making it that the promise understood it."); id.
§ 9-07-15 ("Particular clauses of a contract are subordinate to its general intent"); id. § 9-07-
17 ("Repugnancy in a contract must be reconciled, if possible, by such an interpretation as will
give some effect o a repugnant clause subordinate to the general intent and purposes of the
whole contract."); id. § 9-07-08 ("Words in a contract which are inconsistent with its nature
or the main intention of the parties are to be rejected."); id. § 9-07-20 ("Stipulations which
are necessary to make a contract reasonable or conformable to usage are implied in respect to
matters concerning which the contract manifests no contrary intention."); id. § 9-07-21 ("All
things that in law or usage are considered as incidental to a contract or as necessary to carry
it into effect are implied therefrom, unless some of them are mentioned expressly therein. In
such case, all other things of the same class are deemed to be excluded.").
118. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 160 ("The words of a contract are to be understood
in their ordinary and popular sense, rather than their strict legal meaning, unless used by the
parties in a technical sense, or unless a special meaning is given them by usage, in which case
the latter must be followed."); id. § 161 ("Technical words are to be interpreted as usually
understood by persons in the profession or business to which they relate, unless clearly used
in a different sense.").
119. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-204 ("Repugnancies in a contract must be recon-
ciled, if possible, by such an interpretation as will give some effect to the repugnant clauses,
subordinate to the general intent and purpose of the whole contract."); id. §§ 28-3-304, 28-3-
305,28-3-306,28-3-307,28-3-402,28-3-501,28-3-502,28-3-503,28-3-601,28-3-701,28-3-
702, 28-3-703; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 42.220-42.280 (provisions similar to California regarding
role of party intent, circumstances). Louisiana, despite having a civil law tradition, also has
provisions similar to California and places significant emphasis on party intent and contract
purpose. See, e.g., LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2045 ("Interpretation of a contract is the determina-
tion of the common intent of the parties."); id. art. 2051 ("Although a contract is worded in
general terms, it must be interpreted to cover only those things it appears the parties intended
to include."); id. arts. 2047, 2048, 2049, 2052, (provisions akin to California provisions) but
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address contract construction in its statutes, its commitment to textualism
a product of common law. Its statute on statutory interpretation is largely
instruction on grammar.20
Perhaps surprising in light of Thomas Drayage and textualist criticism
of the state's interpretative jurisprudence, California provides that "[t]he
language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear
and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity"'2 ' and further provides that
"[w]hen a contract is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to
be ascertained form the writing alone, if possible [but] subject, however,
to the other provisions" of the law.'22 This includes the command that "[a]
contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention
of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is
ascertainable and lawful."' In addition, "[w]hen, through fraud, mistake,
or accident, a written contract fails to express the real intention of the par-
ties, such intention is to be regarded, and the erroneous parts of the writing
disregarded."12 4
In words unsurprising to those familiar with Thomas Drayage and other
Traynor Court decisions of the 1960s, California law also provides that "[a]
contract may be explained by reference to the circumstances under which
it was made, and the matter to which it relates."2 5 This contextual provi-
sion somewhere between Thomas Drayage and RLLI Section 3 is not a con-
sequence of the Traynor Court, however. The statute was enacted in 1872.
Regarding interpretation of contract text, California's statutory attempt
to clarify the concept of clear contract text fits comfortably within the
mainstream of contract construction thought, stating:
The words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary and popular
sense, rather than according to their strict legal meaning; unless used by the
also providing that "[w]hen the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd
consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties' intent."); see
also id. arts. 2050, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056 ("Each provision in a contract must be interpreted
in light of the other provision so that each is given the meaning suggested by the contract as
a whole.").
120. See, e.g., N.Y. STAT. § 254 ("Relative or qualifying words of clauses in a statute ordi-
narily are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding, and are not to be
construed as extending to others more remote, until the intent of the statute clearly indicates
otherwise.").
121. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1638.
122. Id. § 1639.
123. Id. § 1636.
124. Id. § 1640.
125. Id. § 1647; see also id. § 1649 ("If the terms of a promise are in any respect ambiguous
or uncertain, it must be interpreted in the sense in which the promisor believe, at the time of
making it, that the promise understood it.").
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parties in a technical sense, or unless a special meaning is given them by usage,
in which case the latter must be followed.126
Technical words are to be interpreted as usually understood by persons in the
profession or business to which they related, unless clearly used in a different
sense. 127
However broad may be the terms of a contract, it extends only to those things
concerning which it appears that the parties intended to contract. 128
Particular clauses of a contract are subordinate to its general intent.129
Repugnancy in a contract must be reconciled, if possible, by such an inter-
pretation as will give some effect to the repugnant clauses, subordinate to the
general intent and purpose of the whole contract."
Words in a contract which are wholly inconsistent with its nature, or with the
main intention of the parties, are to be rejected.131
Stipulations which are necessary to make a contract reasonable, or conform-
able to usage, are implied, in respect to matters concerning which the contract
manifests no contrary intention.13 2
All things that in law or usage are considered as incidental to a contract, or as
necessary to carry it into effect, are implied therefrom, unless some of them
are expressly mentioned therein, when all other things or the same class are
deemed to be excluded.1 33
If no time is specified for the performance of an act required to be performed,
a reasonable time is allowed. If the act is in its nature capable of being done
instantly-as, for example, if it consists in the payment of money only-it
must be performed immediately upon the thing to be done being exactly
ascertained. 134
Where all the parties who unite in a promise receive some benefit from the
consideration, whether past or present, their promise is presumed to be joint
and several.13 5
126. Id. § 1644.
127. Id. § 1645.
128. Id. § 1648.
129. Id. § 1650.
130. Id. § 1652.
131. Id. § 1653.
132. Id. § 1655.
133. Id. § 1656.
134. Id. § 1657.
135. Id. § 1659. In addition, "A promise, made in the singular number, but executed by
several persons, is presumed to be joint and several." Id. § 1660.
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Although statutes like these are helpful, they do not provide a clear or
comprehensive methodology for determining when contract text is suf-
ficiently clear or one that can assign meaning to text in the absence of
context.
The state statutes regarding contract interpretation appear consistent
with what might be termed the modern California approach or the RLLI
approach in that they are not so much advocating admission of specific
extrinsic evidence as endorsing an approach sufficiently contextual that it
requires-or at least permits-contract text to be examined from the out-
set in light of all surrounding circumstances rather than solely on the basis
of the court's reading of the face of the instrument.
For example, Oklahoma provides that "[a] contract may be explained
by reference to the circumstances under which it was made, and the mat-
ter to which it relates"3 6 and also provides a potential avenue for evading
literal text that a Traynor-like judge might drive a truck through: "[w]hen
through fraud, mistake, accident, a written contract fails to express the real
intention of the parties, such intention is to be regarded, and the erroneous
parts of the writing disregarded."" Georgia both eschews what might be
termed "punctuational literalism" that determines meaning according to
rigid application of classical punctuation rules,"' and shows considerable
136. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 163. Oklahoma also provides that "[h]owever broad may
be the terms of a contract, it extends only to those things concerning which it appears that the
parties intended to contract," id. § 164, which reads like an anti-literalism canon.
137. Id. § 156.
138. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 13-2-2(6) ("The rules of grammatical construction usually
govern, but to effectuate the intention they may be disregarded; sentences and words may be
transposed, and conjunctions substituted for each other. In extreme cases of ambiguity, where
the instrument as it stands is without meaning, words may be supplied.").
The term "punctual literalism" is my own and is used to describe punctuation rigidity by
interpreting courts. For example, one relatively recent well-publicized decision made statu-
tory construction turn on absence of a "serial" or "Oxford" comma" (i.e., a comma directly
before the conjunction in a listing), to which the Court created ambiguity about whether a
state law exempting from overtime pay requirements workers engaged in the "canning, pro-
cessing, preserving, freezing, drying, marketing, storing, packing for shipment[no comma] or
distribution: of "perishable foods" applied to truckers working hauling dairy products. The
trucker plaintiffs argued that the absence of a comma between "packaging for shipment" and
"or distribution" meant hat the exception applied only to employees who were engaged in
"packing" for "shipment or distribution" as opposed to "packaging for shipment" on the one
hand, and also employees in engaged in "distribution" e.g., truckers on the other hand.
Although my heart is with truckers trying to get paid, the statute as a whole pretty clearly
intended to exempt them from eligibility for additional pay comma or no comma. By seiz-
ing on the absence of a comma before the conjunction, the Court gave the drivers leverage for
obtaining a substantial settlement but in a manner that elevated punctuation punctiliousness
over a broader assessment of the statute as reflected in the Maine legislature's subsequent
amendment of the law to make it clearer that employers of dairy truck drivers were exempted
overtime requirements. See Oxford Comma Dispute Is Settled as Main Drivers Get $5 Million,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), nytimes.com/2018/02/09/us/oxford-comma-main.html (discussing
O'Connor v. Oakhurst Dairy, 851 E3d 69 (1st Ci. 2017) (applying Maine law).
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concern for vindicating party intent and contract purpose, as do Montana,39
North Dakota,14 0 and Oklahoma.141
Likewise, state statutes that speak to the issue tend to caution against
elevating particular text over party intent or purpose. For example, Okla-
homa law provides that "[w]ords in a contract which are wholly inconsis-
tent with its nature, or with the main intention of the parties, are to be
rejected"142 and that "[s]tipulations which are necessary to make a contract
reasonable and conformable to usage, are implied in respect to matters
concerning which the contrary manifests no contrary intention.1"143
VI. JUDICIAL-LEGISLATIVE TENSION:
THE CONNECTICUT EXAMPLE
Courts in these same states, may, however, be less inclined to worry about
party intent, contract purpose, or public policy and more inclined to scru-
tinize text. Or, conversely, a court that appears insufficiently deferential to
the "plain" text may run afoul of legislative sentiment (or powerful text-
centric interests with legislative clout). This possibility was realized in
Connecticut's experience with its statute concerning statutory interpreta-
tion. Connecticut General Statute § 1-2z states that:
[t]he meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the
text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statues. If, after examining
such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain
and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratex-
tual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.44
The statute was passed after State v. Courchesne,14 which self-consciously
deviated from the professed plain meaning approach that had previ-
ously been applied in the courts, prompting many to see the statute as a
139. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-301 ("A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect
to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same
is ascertainable and lawful."). Intent is to be determined according to "the rules given in this
chapter."); see id. § 28-3-202.
140. See supra note 80.
141. See supra notes 81, 82.
142. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 169.
143. Id. § 171. Oklahoma statute also provides that "[a]ll things that in law or usage are
considered as incidental to a contract, or as necessary to carry it into effect, are implied there-
from, unless some of them are expressly mentioned therein, when all other things of the same
class are deemed to be excluded." Id. § 172.
144. However, Section 1-2z applies only to "statutory language that is clear and unambigu-
ous." "The statute did not overrule the principle that ambiguous statutory language is not
unconstitutionally vague if the legislative history establishes a clear meaning." Gonzalez v.
Surgeon, 937 A.2d 24, 33 n.12 (Conn. 2007).
145. 816 A.2d 562, 586 (Conn. 2003).
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legislative overruling of Courchesne.146 But notwithstanding the statute, the
Connecticut Supreme Court has continued to take the view that the "pur-
pose or purposes" of legislation and "the context of [statutory] language,
broadly understood, are directly relevant to the meaning of the language
of the statute."14 7
Courchesne was perhaps controversial because it so openly and candidly
departed from the textual orthodoxy of judicial ability to understand word
meaning merely by seeing the word. The extensive discussion of the Court
in Courchesne may strike some (and certainly struck me) as the type of
sophisticated and reflective (albeit lengthy) discussion of interpretation
that one would appreciate seeing more frequently in judicial opinions. And
although readers may recoil a bit, I present an extensive excerpt to provide
a flavor of the opinion that triggered legislative reaction and "overruling"
of its methodology:
This claim presents a question of statutory interpretation. "The process of
statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the leg-
islature. ["] In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the
meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of this case, including
the question of whether the language actually does apply. In seeking to deter-
mine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative
history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy
it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and
common law principles governing the same general subject matter.1'4
8
We now make explicit that our approach to the process of statutory inter-
pretation. . . . [We first engage in a] "reasoned search for the intention of the
legislature," which we further defined as a reasoned search for "the meaning
of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the
question of whether the language actually does apply." (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) The rest of the formulation sets forth the range of sources
that we will examine in order to determine that meaning. That formulation
admonishes the court to consider all relevant sources of meaning of the lan-
guage at issue-namely, the words of the statute, its legislative history and
the circumstances surrounding its enactment, the legislative policy it was
designed to implement, and its relationship to existing legislation and to com-
mon-law principles governing the same general subject matter. Id. We also
now make explicit that we ordinarily will consider all of those sources beyond
146. See Envirotest Sys. Corp. v. Comm'r of Motor Vehicles, 978 A.2d 49 (Conn. 2009)
(viewing statute as response to Courchesne).
147. Bell At. Nynex Mobile, Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue Servs., 869 A.2d 611, 617 (Conn.
2005).
148. Courchesne, 816 A.2d at 544 (citations omitted); see also id. at 546-48 (conducting
extensive linguistic analysis of statute).
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the language itself, without first having to cross any threshold of ambiguity
of the language.
We emphasize, moreover, that the language of the statute is the most
important factor to be considered, for three very fundamental reasons. First,
the language of the statute is what the legislature enacted and the governor
signed. It is, therefore, the law. Second, the process of interpretation is, in
essence, the search for the meaning of that language as applied to the facts
of the case, including the question of whether it does apply to those facts.
Third, all language has limits, in the sense that we are not free to attribute to
legislative language a meaning that it simply will not bear in the usage of the
English language.
Therefore-and we make this explicit as well-we always begin the process
of interpretation with a searching examination of that language, attempting
to determine the range of plausible meanings that it may have in the context
in which it appears and, if possible, narrowing that range down to those that
appear most plausible. Thus, the statutory language is always the starting point
of the interpretive inquiry. [But] we do not end the process with the language.
The reason for this . . . is that "the legislative process is purposive, and ...
the meaning of legislative language (indeed, of any particular use of our lan-
guage) is best understood by viewing not only the language at issue, but by its
context and by the purpose or purposes behind its use."
Thus, the purpose or purposes of the legislation, and the context of that
legislative language . . . are directly relevant to its meaning as applied to the
facts of the case before us. See L. Fuller, "Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A
Reply to Professor Hart," 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630, 664 (1958) (it is not "possible
to interpret a word in a statute without knowing the aim of the statute"); S.
Breyer, "On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes," 65 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 845, 853 (1992) ("[a] court often needs to know the purpose a par-
ticular statutory word or phrase serves within the broader context of a statu-
tory scheme in order to decide properly whether a particular circumstance falls
within the scope of that word or phrase"); E Frankfurter, "Some Reflections on
the Reading of Statutes," 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 538-39 (1947) ("Legislation
has an aim; it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an inadequacy, to effect
a change of policy, to formulate a plan of government. That aim, that policy
is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evinced in the language of the
statute, as read in the light of other external manifestations of purpose.").
Indeed, in our view, the concept of the context of statutory language should
be broadly understood. That is, the context of statutory language necessarily
includes the other language used in the statute or statutory scheme at issue,
the language used in other relevant statutes, the general subject matter of the
legislation at issue, the history or genealogy of the statute, as well as the other,
extratextual sources .... All of these sources, textual as well as contextual, are
to be considered, along with the purpose or purposes of the legislation, in
determining the meaning of the language of the statute as applied to the facts
of the case.149
149. Id. at 578-90, 587-93 (footnotes and case citations omitted).
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The Courchesne Court then provided an extensive assessment of the plain
meaning concept:
This brings us to a discussion of what is commonly known as the "plain mean-
ing rule." Although we have used many different formulations of the plain
meaning rule, all of them have in common the fundamental premise, stated
generally, that, where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the
court must stop its interpretive process with that language; there is in such a
case no room for interpretation; and, therefore, in such a case, the court must
not go beyond that language.
I[t] is useful to note that both the plain meaning rule and [more contextu-
alist approaches] have, as a general matter, their starting points in common:
both begin by acknowledging that the task of the court is to ascertain the
intent of the legislature in using the language that it chose to use, so as to
determine its meaning in the context of the case.
[U]nder the plain meaning rule, there are certain cases in which that task
must, as a matter of law, end with the statutory language. Thus, it is necessary
to state precisely what the plain meaning rule means.
The plain meaning rule means that in a certain category of cases-namely,
those in which the court first determines that the language at issue is plain and
unambiguous-the court is precluded as a matter of law from going beyond the
text of that language to consider any extratextual evidence of the meaning of
that language, no matter how persuasive that evidence might be. Indeed, the
rule even precludes reference to that evidence where that evidence, if con-
sulted, would support or confirm that plain meaning. Furthermore, inherent
in the plain meaning rule is the admonition that the courts are to seek the
objective meaning of the language used by the legislature "not in what [the
legislature] meant to say, but in [the meaning of] what it did say." Another
inherent part of the plain meaning rule is the exception that the plain and
unambiguous meaning is not to be applied if it would produce an unworkable
or absurd result.
Thus, the plain meaning rule, at least as most commonly articulated in
our jurisprudence, may be restated as follows: If the language of the statute
is plain and unambiguous, and if the result yielded by that plain and unam-
biguous meaning is not absurd or unworkable, the court must not interpret
the language (i.e., there is no room for construction); instead, the court's sole
task is to apply that language literally to the facts of the case, and it is pre-
cluded as a matter of law from consulting any extratextual sources regarding
the meaning of the language at issue. Furthermore, in deciding whether the
language is plain and unambiguous, the court is confined to what may be
regarded as the objective meaning of the language used by the legislature,
and may not inquire into what the legislature may have intended the language
to mean--that is, it may not inquire into the purpose or purposes for which
the legislature used the language. Finally, the plain meaning rule sets forth a
set of thresholds of ambiguity or uncertainty, and the court must surmount
each of those thresholds in order to consult additional sources of meaning
of the language of the statute. Thus, whatever may lie beyond any of those
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thresholds may in any given case be barred from consideration by the court,
irrespective of its ultimate usefulness in ascertaining the meaning of the statu-
tory language at issue.
We now make explicit what is implicit in what we have already said: in
performing the process of statutory interpretation, we do not follow the plain
meaning rule in whatever formulation it may appear. We disagree with the
plain meaning rule as a useful rubric for the process of statutory interpreta-
tion for several reasons.
First, the rule is fundamentally inconsistent with the purposive and con-
textual nature of legislative language. Legislative language is purposive and
contextual, and its meaning simply cannot be divorced from the purpose or
purposes for which it was used and from its context. Put another way, it does
matter, in determining that meaning, what purpose or purposes the legislature
had in employing the language; it does matter what meaning the legislature
intended the language to have.
Second, the plain meaning rule is inherently self- contradictory. It is a mis-
nomer to say, as the plain meaning rule says, that, if the language is plain and
unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation, because application of the
statutory language to the facts of the case is interpretation of that language. In
such a case, the task of interpretation may be a simple matter, but that does
not mean that no interpretation is required.
The plain meaning rule is inherently self-contradictory in another way.
That part of the rule that excepts from its application cases in which the plain
language would yield an absurd or unworkable result is implicitly, but nec-
essarily, premised on the process of going beyond the text of the statute to
the legislature's intent in writing that text. This is because the only plausible
reason for that part of the rule is that the legislature could not have intended
for its language to have a meaning that yielded such a result.... [A]pplication
of this aspect of the plain meaning rule requires an implicit inquiry into the
legislature's intent or purpose, beyond the bare text, thus, in effect, permitting
the court to rule out the plain meaning of the language because that meaning
would produce an absurd or unworkable result. We see no persuasive reason
for a rule of law that prohibits a court from similarly going beyond the bare
text of the statute to rule in a different meaning that other sources of meaning
might suggest in any given case. Yet such a prohibition is precisely what the
plain meaning rule accomplishes.
Third, application of the plain meaning rule necessarily requires the court
to engage in a threshold determination of whether the language is ambiguous.
This requirement, in turn, has led this court into a number of declarations
that are, in our view, intellectually and linguistically dubious, and risk leav-
ing the court open to the criticism of being result-oriented in interpreting
statutes. Thus, for example, we have stated that statutory language does not
become ambiguous "merely because the parties contend for different mean-
ings." Yet, if parties contend for different meanings, and each meaning is
plausible, that is essentially what "ambiguity" ordinarily means in such a con-
text in our language. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary, and
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th Ed.), for the various meanings
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of "ambiguity" and "ambiguous" in this context. For example, in Merriam-
Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, the most apt definition of "ambiguous" for
this context is: "Capable of being understood in two or more possible senses or
ways." We also have stated that, although the statutory language is clear on its
face, it contains a "latent ambiguity" that is disclosed by its application to the
facts of the case, or by reference to its legislative history and purpose. Statutory
language, however, always requires some application to the facts of the case.
Therefore, the notion of such a "latent ambiguity" as a predicate to resort to
extratextual sources simply does not make sense. Moreover, we have stated
that the plain meaning principle does not apply where the statutory language,
although clear and unambiguous, is not "absolutely clear and unambiguous .... "
(Emphasis in original.) The line of demarcation between clear and unambigu-
ous language, on one hand, and absolutely clear and unambiguous language, on
the other hand, however, eludes us. We have stated further that the court may
go beyond the literal language of the statute when "a common sense interpre-
tation leads to an ambiguous . . . result . . . ." It is similarly difficult to make
sense of the notion of otherwise clear language becoming ambiguous because
it leads to an "ambiguous ... result .... "
Eschewing the plain meaning rule does not mean, however, that we will not in
any given case follow what may be regarded as the plain meaning of the lan-
guage. Indeed, in most cases, that meaning will, once the extratextual sources
of meaning contained in the Bender formulation are considered, prove to be
the legislatively intended meaning of the language. There are cases, however;
in which the extratextual sources will indicate a different meaning strongly enough
to lead the court to conclude that the legislature intended the language to have that
different meaning. Importantly, and consistent with our admonition that the statu-
tory language is the most important factor in this analysis, in applying the Bender
formulation, we necessarily employ a kind of sliding scale: the more strongly the bare
text of the language suggests a particular meaning, the more persuasive the extra-
textual sources will have to be in order for us to conclude that the legislature intended
a different meaning. Such a sliding scale, however; is easier to state than to apply. In
any given case, it necessarily will come down to a judgmental weighing of all of the
evidence bearing on the question.
[Although] no other jurisdiction specifically has adopted the particular formu-
lation for statutory interpretation that we now adopt, there is really nothing
startlingly new about its core, namely, the idea that the court may look for
the meaning of otherwise clear statutory language beyond its literal meaning,
even when that meaning would not yield an absurd or unworkable result. It
stretches back to the sixteenth century.
The intent of the lawmakers is the soul of the statute, and the search for this intent
we have held to be the guiding star of the court. It must prevail over the literal sense
and the precise letter of the language of the statute. When one construction leads
to public mischief which another construction will avoid, the latter is to be
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favored unless the terms of the statute absolutely forbid. Sutherland on Statu-
tory Construction [Ed. 1891] § 323 ....
In summary, we now restate the process by which we interpret statutes as
follows: "The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search
for the intention of the legislature.["] In other words, we seek to determine,
in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the
facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually
does apply. In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute
itself, to the legislative history and circumstances urrounding its enactment, to the
legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing leg-
islation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter" Thus,
this process requires us to consider all relevant sources of the meaning of the language
at issue, without having to cross any threshold or thresholds of ambiguity.
Thus, we do not follow the plain meaning rule.
In performing this task, we begin with a searching examination of the lan-
guage of the statute, because that is the most important factor to be consid-
ered. In doing so, we attempt to determine its range of plausible meanings
and, if possible, narrow that range to those that appear most plausible. We do
not, however, end with the language. We recognize, further, that the purpose
or purposes of the legislation, and the context of the language, broadly under-
stood, are directly relevant to the meaning of the language of the statute.
This does not mean, however, that we will not, in a given case, follow what
may be regarded as the plain meaning of the language, namely, the meaning
that, when the language is considered without reference to any extratextual
sources of its meaning, appears to be the meaning and that appears to preclude
any other likely meaning. In such a case, the more strongly the bare text supports
such a meaning, the more persuasive the extratextual sources of meaning will have to
be in order to yield a different meaning.
[The dissent] suggests that judges, by employing a purposive approach to
statutory interpretation rather than the plain meaning rule, will substitute our
own notions of wise and intelligent policy for the policy of the legislature. We
agree that this may happen; any court may be intellectually dishonest in per-
forming any judicial task, whether it be interpreting a statute or adjudicating a
dispute involving only the common law. We suggest, however, that the risk of
intellectual dishonesty is just as great, or as minimal, in employing the plain mean-
ing rule as in employing the method of interpretation that we articulate. If a court is
determined to be intellectually dishonest and reach the result that it wants the statute
to mandate, rather than the result that an honest and objective appraisal of its mean-
ing would yield, it will find a way to do so under any articulated rubric of statutory
interpretation. Furthermore, by insisting that all evidence of meaning be considered
and explained before the court arrives at the meaning of a statute, we think that the
risk of intellectual dishonesty in performing that task will be minimized. Indeed,
resort to and explanation of extratextual sources may provide a certain trans-
parency to the court's analytical and interpretive process that could be lacking
under the employment of the plain meaning rule. In sum, we have confidence
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in the ability of this court to ascertain, explain and apply the purpose or pur-
poses of a statute in an intellectually honest manner."0
The Connecticut situation in which a thoughtful, reflective court opin-
ion prompted legislative backlash that on its face goes beyond typical appli-
cation of the plain meaning approach is regrettable (the responsive statute
seeks to ban consideration of not only clearly extrinsic evidence such as
pre-contract statements of the parties, but also anything "extratextual"). It
is more than a little disheartening to seeing the legislature of a state with
presumably more pressing issues intervene to attack a reflective, erudite
judicial opinion that, while disapproving of rigid application of a highly
textualist plain meaning rule, hardly shuns statutory text.
Legislators should cheer rather than quash sophisticated judicial attempts
to better interpret text and achieve correct construction of text. The Con-
necticut episode is also unusual in that courts tend to be proponents of a
text-centered, plain meaning approach to contract interpretation-at least
in theory and rhetoric-perhaps more so than the legislatures that have
enacted contract construction statutes such as those discussed in the previ-
ous section. As shown above, legislated standards of contract construction
may on the whole be more supportive of a contextual approach than the
state court bench.
150. Id. at 578-90 (footnotes and case citations omitted; emphasis added). Regarding the
legislative-judicial interplay surrounding the Courchesne decision and reaction to it, see Glen
Staszewski, The Dumbing Down of Statutory Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 209,264-65 (2015).
Although Professor Staszewski does not bluntly accuse the Connecticut legislature and its
relatively common notion of the right approach to interpretation as a "dumbing down," that
inference can be made of his general attack on seeking simpler or reductionist interpretative
methodologies in the interests of achieving uniformity and consistency.
For further examination of the Connecticut legislature's response to Courchesne, see Thomas
A. Bishop, The Death and Reincarnation of Plain Meaning in Connecticut: A Case Study, 41 CONN.
L. REV. 827, 851-57 (2009) (noting that statute passed state house by vote or 144-0 and state
senate by 20-16 vote and that key proponent of the legislation was Sen. Andrew McDonald,
a liberal Democrat (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AndrewJ._McDonald; https://ctmirror
.org/202 1/01/14/once-controversial-judge-andrew-mcdonald-backed-for-reappointment
-to-cts-high-court), who now sits on the Connecticut Supreme Court).
Such is the widespread allegiance to the plain meaning rule and arguably widespread mis-
understanding about the rule and its contextual counterpoint. See id. at 853 (noting that "leg-
islative history reveals that the judiciary committee believed Courchesne represented a radical
departure from normative statutory interpretation and that the court's rejection of the plain
meaning rule reflected judicial disrespect for legislative primacy in law making"-a view that
I regard as a wildly inaccurate assessment of the nuanced analysis in Courchesne). Courchesne
was a death penalty case where the statutory interpretation discussion was rather clearly dicta
designed to make a statement about interpretation, rather than to decide the case and in
which the court took a supportive view of the death penalty, which is normally the politically
safer path for judges. The court concluded that the convicted defendant was death penalty
eligible on the basis of an aggravating factor in one of the two murders he committed; the
state need not demonstrate aggravating factors in the second murder. Adding to the irony of
Courchesne is that it may be the only pro-death penalty decision triggering significant backlash
against the rendering court.
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In spite of the trouble it caused with the legislature, I cannot help but
read the Courchesne opinion and wish more courts would engage in the
same sort of transparent, self-conscious, sophisticated approach to discern-
ing the meaning of text not only in statutes but also in regulations, con-
tracts, and other documents-all of which typically have a purpose and
a specific intent affecting public policy, private rights, or both. Particu-
larly refreshing is the Courchesne Court's acknowledgment of (what is to
me) an obvious point: textualism is every bit as subject to result-oriented
judicial manipulation (perhaps more) as broader and more contextualist
approaches to discerning word meaning and legal force.
VII. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF PLAIN MEANING
A. Generalized Tautology
As noted at the outset, searching for court decisions using the term plain
meaning provides an avalanche of cases too voluminous to wade through.
Even limiting a search by year typically yields thousands of cases. Limit-
ing by month still typically produces hundreds of cases. Even a narrower
search for use of the term only in insurance coverage disputes yields a
rough average of ten cases each week. For example, a LEXIS search of this
type produced more than 350 cases in 2021 alone.'5 '
Examining decisions on a case-by-case, trial-and-error method based
on their ranking in response to various database searches does not (at
least from my perspective) reveal decisions that are particularly enlight-
ening as to what constitutes plain meaning. One is largely left with the
view that courts indeed take an "I know it when I see it" approach to the
determination.
Courts in some cases give some indication of what they meant by plain
meaning. But they almost never explain how it was they discerned that
meaning was plain - at least in the cases in which the court made this type
of finding of sufficiently clear, unambiguous policy language. It is primar-
ily in the cases where language was found not to be sufficiently plain that
the courts offered some explanation of their lexical analysis. Typical of the
caselaw are statements such as the following:
unambiguous terms of an insurance policy require no construction, and the
plain meaning of such terms must be given full effect .... 152
151. For the Lexis search, use terms of date=2021 and name (insur! or assur! or Lloyd! or
fidelity or surety and plain meaning) (conducted July 24, 2021).
152. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. H.S.I. Fin. Servs., Inc., 466 S.E.2d 4, 5 (Ga. 1996). This decision
was quoted favorably in Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Cribb, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17785, at *10-11
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2019).
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[an] unambiguous policy provision must be accorded its plain and ordinary
meaning, and the court may not disregard the plain meaning of the policy's
language in order to find an ambiguity where none exists." 3
Courts must give full effect to the plain meaning of clear and unambiguous
insurance policy contract provisions."4
Where the language in an insurance contract is plain and unambiguous, a
court must interpret the policy in accordance with the plain meaning so as to
give effect to the policy as written."5
[I]f contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs.156
[W]hen [policy] language 'is clear and unequivocal, [each] party will be bound
by its plain meaning."7
an insurance policy must be read as a whole and construed according to the
plain meaning of its terms.158
If the language of the policy is clear and unambiguous, then it will be given its
ordinary and plain meaning."9
B. Partial Explanation
Occasionally, a court's discussion of plain meaning and the plain meaning
rule is a bit more expansive.
"[P]lain meaning is the one commonly understood in the context of insurance
contracts."160
"Nuanced connotations may represent he plain meaning of a term in context
even though those connotations result from tacit knowledge, accumulated
experience, and common sense that are not reflected well-if at all-in dic-
tionary definitions."161
Court looks at policy language "to ascertain its plain meaning or the meaning
a layperson would ordinarily attach to it." 162
153. Bassuk Bros. v. Utica First Ins. Co., 768 N.Y.S.2d 479, 481 (App. Div. 2003).
154. Capitol Specialty Ins. Corp. v. Tayworsky LLC, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 12110, at *7 (S.D.
W. Va., Jan. 25, 2019).
155. Wash. Nat. Ins. Corp. v. Ruderman, 117 So. 3d 943, 948 (Fla. 2013).
156. Powerine Oil Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 4th 377, 390 (2005).
157. IDT Corp. v. U.S. Specialty Ins. Co., 2019 Del. Super. LEXIS 55, at *17 (Jan. 31,
2019) (citation omitted).
158. KA Together, Inc. v. Aspen Specialty Ins. Co., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12184, at *11
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2019) (quoting Selective Way Ins. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 724 E
Supp. 2d 520, 521 (E.D. Pa. 2010)).
159. Oldcastle Precast v. Concrete Accessories of Ga., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16773, at *18
(D. Idaho Jan. 31, 2019).
160. Or. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 2019 Or. App. LEXIS
152 (Jan. 30, 2019) (determining that one of two automobile policies was excess and the other
primary).
161. State v. Gonzalez-Valenzuela, 365 P.3d 116, 121 (Or. 2015).
162. Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., Inc., 900 P.2d 619, 627 (Cal. 1995).
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Plain meaning is the meaning "a layperson would ascribe to contract
language."163
[T]o determine the meaning of an ambiguous contract, the trier of fact must
determine what a reasonable person would have understood the language to
mean and the words used must be construed given their ordinary meaning.164
We rely on the plain meaning of the test as expressing legislative intent unless
a different meaning is supplied by legislative definition or is apparent from the
context, or the plain meaning leads to absurd results.
165
When courts refuse to find plain meaning in a policy term, they are more
likely to offer a substantive assessment of what constitutes plain meaning as
opposed to ambiguity.
Language is ambiguous if it is "reasonably susceptible of different construc-
tions and capable of being understood in more than one sense."
166
In addition to [dictionary] definitions, a plain meaning analysis must include
reading words and phrases in context and construing them in accordance with
the rules of grammar and common usage.167
163. MU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253, 1264 (Cal. 1990); see also Whittaker
Corp. v. MG Specialty Ins. Co., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23744, at *22 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6,
2019) ("When interpreting the language as a whole, one definition of the word 'accrue' makes
sense: to come into existence as a legally enforceable claim"); In re Lair, 235 B.R. 1 (Bankr.
M.D. La. 1999) ('"Plain meaning' does not mean 'simple to understand.' Several courts have
used a plain meaning analysis to reach diametrically opposed interpretations of [11 U.S.C.]
§ 521(2)."); United Nuclear Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 252 P.3d 798, 810-14 (N.M. Ct. App.
2011) (using dictionary to interpret term "sudden" in qualified pollution exclusion but also
buttressing construction by reference to the text of the entire policy, the context surrounding
the issuance of the policy, as well as examining precedent and noting division of authority
on meaning of the qualified pollution exclusion). But see United Nuclear Corp. v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 285 P.3d 644 (N.M. 2012) (reversing court of appeals and finding meaning of "sud-
den" sufficiently ambiguous to permit consideration of extrinsic evidence and that ambiguity
remained unresolved, requiring construction against insurer as drafter of policy and in order
to honor objectively reasonable expectations of the policyholder); Moore v. State, 34 A.3d
513, 519 (Md. 2011) ("When conducting a plain meaning analysis, we have observed that
dictionary definitions 'provide a useful starting point for discerning what he legislature could
have meant in using a particular term.") (citations omitted); see also id. at 519-22 (also examin-
ing structure of statute and legislative history as guides to statutory meaning but referring to
its methodology as a plain meaning approach). But see id. at 518 (where statutory language
unambiguous, court should not examine extrinsic evidence). The Moore court concluded that
a "firearm" could include an inoperable weapon and notwithstanding the rule of lenity
affirmed conviction for possession of an unregistered, but inoperable, gun.
164. Clark v. Prudential Prop. & Case. Ins. Co., 66 P.3d 242, 245 (Idaho 2003).
165. Willacy Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Sebastian Cotton & Grain, Ltd., 55 S.W.3d 29, 38
(Tex. 2018).
166. Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. 1999).
167. Lane v. State, 933 S.W2d 504, 515 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); accord Bingham v.
State, 913 S.W2d 208, 209-10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
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An ambiguous policy provision is one "reasonably susceptible of two different
meanings or of such doubtful meaning that reasonable minds might be uncer-
tain or disagree as to its meaning"68
[A court is] obligated to give an insurance contract that construction which
comports with the reasonable expectations of the insured.169
The standard is what a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the insured
would expect the language to mean.170
[Refusing to consider dictionaries and precedent in text construction] would
relegate plain meaning analysis of statutory language to the subjective impres-
sion of appellate judges with no standards to guide interpretation.171
C. More Pronounced Attempts toArticulate and Defend the Plain
Meaning Concept
Although not all opinions using the term plain meaning (and its cousins)
are reductive and conclusory, thoughtful discussion of plain meaning such
as Courchesne are rare. Decisions defending the plain meaning approach
tend reflect considerably less depth than Courchesne-like contextualist anal-
yses, as reflected in the cases discussed below.
1. Contract Case Examples
The Wyoming Supreme Court decision in Schell v. Scallon devotes more
attention to the plain meaning concept than most cases, but still falls short
of offering much explanation for the manner in which a court should deter-
mine the clarity of language. In addition, its holding raises questions about
the efficacy of its approach and the correctness of the decision, which held
that home buyers were without recourse against the seller for a house that
had an inadequate well that ran dry shortly after the sale.
We afford the contract's terms the plain meaning that a reasonable person
would give to them. "We employ common sense and 'ascribed the words with
a rational and reasonable intent."' "We consider the language in the context
168. Glen Falls Ins. Co. v. Smith, 617 S.E.2d 760 (W. Va. 2005) (quoted approvingly in
Capitol Specialty Ins. Corp. v. Tayworsky LLC, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 12110, at *7 (S.D. W.Va.,
Jan. 25, 2019)).
169. Burr v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 359 S.E.2d 626,631 (. Va. 1987).
170. Thompson v. State Auto. Mut. Ins., 11 S.E.2d 849, 850 (1940).
171. Lane v. State, 933 S.W2d 504, 515 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Common terms "are
to be construed in their natural, plain and ordinary sense, and courts may inform their under-
standing of such words by consulting a dictionary." C.H. Heist Carib Corp. v. Am. Home
Assur. Co., 640 E2d 479, 481 (3d Cir. 2018); see also KA Together, Inc. v. Aspen Specialty Ins.
Co., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12184, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2019). Determining that he term
"entrust" is a commonly used term and that it means "to confer a trust on" or "to commit
to another with confidence" based on a case); Grover Com. Enters., Inc. v. Aspen Ins. UK,
Ltd, 202 So. 3d 877 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (making this determination on the basis of the
Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2005)).
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in which it was written, looking to the surrounding circumstances, the subject
matter, and the purpose of the agreement to ascertain the intent of the par-
ties at the time the agreement was made." "We presume each provision in a
contact has a purpose, and we avoid interpreting a contract so as to find incon-
sistent provision or so as to render any provision meaningless."
When the contract's provisions are clear and unambiguous, we look only
to the "four corners" of the document to determine the parties' intent and we
enforce the terms of the contract as written. "An ambiguous contract is one
which either contains a double meaning or is obscure in its meaning because
of indefiniteness of expression. Whether a contact is ambiguous is a matter of
law, and the parties' disagreement as to a contract's meaning does not mean
the contract is ambiguous. Because we use an objective approach to interpret
contracts, evidence of the parties' subjective intent is not relevant or admis-
sible in interpreting a contract."7
This court concluded that "[u]nder the plain meaning of its terms, we
conclude the language was unambiguous and did not require Sellers to
complete a well, before the date of closing, with any greater function than
producing water."' The Court thus rejected the buyer's complaint that
the well on the purchased property failed to comply with the provision
when it developed significant problems within months of the April 2015
closing and stopped working altogether or ran dry by June 2016.4
172. Schell v. Scallon, 433 P.3d 879, 885 (Wyo. 2019) (citations omitted); see also id. (using
dictionary definitions from Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2003) to deter-
mine the meaning of an agreement hat a seller would "complete a fully functional water well
prior to closing").
173. Id.
174. This type of well failure seems severe enough that it would violate the implied war-
ranty of merchantability if the house were a "good" within the meaning of the Uniform
Commercial Code, making Schnell v. Scallon seem at least to me -a harsh decision. But the
opinion also notes other aspects of the transaction that can reasonably be read as the sale hav-
ing something akin to an "as is" character and the buyers did not inspect the well, which was
at least nominally working at the time of closing, prior to purchase.
The case provides an interesting clash of two opposing concerns in disputes over a sale that
has disappointed a party to the transaction. Which is the more "just" result: providing a rem-
edy to the disappointed party? Or refraining from imposing liability on a party that appears
not to have committed fraud or otherwise acted dishonorably but nonetheless provided an
inferior product?
Schell v. Scallon is silent as to the purchase price of the property. I would argue that this is
relevant to determining how broad or narrow a construction to give to the contract duty of
the seller to "complete a fully functional well." If the home purchase was bargain basement,
the Wyoming Supreme Court's analysis (in a unanimous opinion) seems correct. If the home
was sold a price associated with homes that had no well problems, the result seems harsh and
unjust for the buyers. An examination of such evidence, which is only partially extrinsic, would
be illuminating. The price presumably was on the face of the contract while the local real
estate market is extrinsic information but information capable of rather ready and accurate
determination, almost in the manner of judicial notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence
202, through a look at local listings and recent comparable sales, which are normally available
in government records and through real estate websites such as Redfin.
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The court was unsympathetic, reasoning that "[t]he parties were free
to define 'fully functional" or the requirement's other terms, but did not,
and we will not write terms into a contract under the guise of contract
interpretation."'7 5 The court then, however "bolstered" its linguistic analy-
sis "in the context of the purpose" of the contract and discussed the con-
text of the purchase at sufficient length176 that one could be forgiven for
viewing this as the equivalent of a California-like examination of extrinsic
evidence. However, the court rejected the buyers' "request that we look
outside the four corners of the contract and consider circumstances sur-
rounding execution of the agreement" such as "industry standards and the
State Engineer's minimum construction standards for water wells. 7 7
One non-insurance case provides an extensive discussion of the concept
and the extent to which arguably clear contract language may qualify as
having a plain meaning. In Mellon Bank, NA. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc.,178
the court reversed and remanded a trial court decision that had considered
extrinsic evidence contradicting what the appellate court regarded as the
plain meaning of a contract provision. Although not essential to the court's
decision, its discussion of the plain meaning concept and consideration of
extrinsic evidence is illustrative:
In a world where semantics is a science instead of an art we might be able to
read a contract and understand it without question. However, English is often
a difficult and elusive language and certainly not uniform among all who use
it. External indicia of the parties' intent other than written words are use-
ful, and probably indispensable, in interpreting contract terms. If each judge
simply applied his own linguistic background and experience to the words of
a contract, contracting parties would live in a most uncertain environment.
It is the role of the judge to consider the words of the contract, the alternative
meaning suggested by counsel, and the nature of the objective evidence to be
offered in support of that meaning. The trial judge must then determine if a
full evidentiary hearing is warranted. If a reasonable alternative interpretation
is suggested, even though it may be alien to the judge's linguistic experience,
My larger point is that, regardless of whether the Schell v. Scallon decision is "right" or
"wrong," it would have been improved by a broader analysis of the disputed transaction and
its documentation.
175. Id. at 885.
176. Id. at 885-86.
177. Id. at 886; see also id. at 886-87 ("Buyers arguments on this point are unconvincing for
two reasons. First, the contract does not reference either set of standards. Second, Buyers have
not shown that 'fully functional' has a particularized or technical meaning in the water well
industry, or that, if it did, we should presume the parties intended 'fully functional' to imply
compliance with standards for an industry in which neither party participates.").
178. 619 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1980).
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objective evidence in support of that interpretation should be considered by
the fact finder. See Corbin on Contracts § 542.19
The Third Circuit further explained its view of the role of extrinsic evi-
dence and the "four corners" rule in contract interpretation in a lengthy
footnote:
It is only by this approach that courts can achieve consistency in contract
interpretation.
The strict "four-corners" doctrine allows a court to sit in an isolated posi-
tion and decide if words are "clear" or "ambiguous." Judges today come from
a variety of backgrounds private law practice, government service, business,
academia and their fields of experience represent an even wider variance. The
parties who appear before the court in these times of complex commercial
transactions come from a variety of specialized worlds of trade. It is the par-
ties' linguistic reference that is relevant, not the judges'. The judge is in his or
her linguistic field of expertise only when viewing words which lawyers have
developed as terms of legal art. Even when the judge faces the need to inter-
pret legal terms of art, extrinsic evidence and legal briefing are useful.
For example, a contract might provide for a party to pay "$10,000 for 100
ounces of platinum." A judge might state that the quoted words are so clear
and unambiguous that parol evidence is not admissible to vary their meaning.
That judge might never learn that the parties have a consistent past practice
of dealing only in Canadian dollars and follow a standard trade practice of
measuring platinum in troy ounces (12 to the pound instead of 16). This is
because that judge's linguistic frame of reference includes the dollars and the
ounces he or she encounters in daily life. This is not the linguistic frame of
reference of the commercial parties.
There are many other examples which demonstrate the necessity of the
approach we outline. A "pound" of caviar is always 14 ounces. One can readily
see the difficulty counsel might have convincing a judge who never has eaten
caviar that a "pound" can be 14 ounces. The case could also come before a
judge who is a lifelong gourmet and consumer of caviar. To the gourmet judge
it might be "clear and unambiguous" that a pound of caviar is 14 ounces.
Similarly, in the lumber business a "two by four" is never really two inches
by four inches, but somewhat smaller. The background of some judges might
make them aware of this, the background of others might not. Following the
approach we outline in this opinion a consistent result could be reached in
each case the parties would be bound to the same meaning of the external
signs of their intent. When the judge who knows only common usage is told
that a specialized usage can be shown which is common to both parties, he will
realize an ambiguity can exist and will admit evidence to determine the mean-
ing by which the parties should be bound. Under a "four-corners" approach
179. Id. at 1010-11 (footnote omitted).
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to the question of ambiguity, the result would depend on which judge heard
the case.180
But notwithstanding the Third Circuit's acknowledgment of numerous
circumstances where extrinsic evidence could bear on the interpretation
of what might upon first glance appear to be facially unambiguous terms,
the decision ultimately held that the extrinsic evidence considered by the
trial court exceeded the limited purposes for which such evidence could be
considered:
But our approach does not authorize a trial judge to demote the written word
to a reduced status in contract interpretation. Although extrinsic evidence may
be considered under proper circumstances, the parties remain bound by the
appropriate objective definition of the words they use to express their intent.
Generally parties will be held to definitions given to words in specialized
commercial and trade areas in which they deal. Similarly, certain words attain
binding definition as legal terms of art. Dates, numbers and the like generally
cannot be varied [(but noting that example of "two by four" lumber shows
even this textual norm has exceptions)]. For example, extrinsic evidence may
be used to show that "Ten Dollars paid on January 5, 1980," meant ten Cana-
dian dollars, but it would not be allowed to show the parties meant twenty
dollars. Trade terms, legal terms of art, numbers, common words of accepted
usage and terms of a similar nature should be interpreted in accord with their
specialized or accepted usage unless such an interpretation would produce
irrational results or the contract documents are internally inconsistent.
We have concluded that the district court here exceeded the permissible
boundary of interpretation. We believe its [narrower] interpretation of insol-
vency [as the term was used in the contract] was improperly restrictive. Com-
mercial parties entered a Buy-Sell Agreement using a well defined commercial
term and legal term of art [in using the word] "insolvent."181
2. Criminal Case Illustrations
In United States v. Rodriguez, 711 E3d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 2013), the court
stated that it would "adopt a plain-meaning approach to determining what
constitutes a "crime of violence" for purposes of enhancement of a crimi-
nal sentence because of defendant's prior conviction for "sexual abuse of a
minor" and "statutory rape" and set forth the following protocol:
First, we identify the undefined offense category that triggers the federal sen-
tencing enhancement. We then evaluate whether the meaning of that offense
category is clear from the language of the enhancement at issue or its appli-
cable commentary. If not, we proceed to step two, and determine whether that
undefined offence category is an offense category defined at common law, or
180. Id. at 1011 n.12 (citations omitted).
181. Id. at 1013 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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an offense category that is not defined at common law. Third, if the offense
category is a non-common-law offense category, then we derive its "generic,
contemporary meaning" from its common usage as stated in legal and other
well-accepted dictionaries. Fourth, we look to the elements of the state statute
of conviction and evaluate whether those elements comport with the generic
meaning of the enumerated offence category. This plain-meaning approach is
faithful to the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor v. United States, [495 U.S.
575 (1990)] but does not impose a cumbersome methodological requirement
on lower courts to conduct a nationwide survey and look to the majority of
state courts-as well as the Model Penal Code, federal law, and criminal law
treatises-when deriving the meaning of an undefined offense category enu-
merated in a federal sentencing enhancement.18
Rodriguez, like many cases discussing interpretative process at length, is a
criminal case, which implicates the "rule of lenity" providing that criminal
statutes must be sufficiently clear to support conviction and are strictly
construed against the government. The lenity concept instructs the court
to resolve unclear statutory language in favor of the defendant on the
ground that a person should only be subjected to criminal punishment if
the language of the statute is sufficiently clear. Jorge Cabeccera Rodriguez
was before the court on a guilty plea for illegal reentry into the United
States after his deportation (a violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326) and received
a 23-month sentence, that was enhanced because of prior convictions in
Texas, where he had engaged in sex with a 16-year-old girl (sexual assault
of a "child" in violation of Texas Penal Code 22.011(a)(2)).
Cases discussing the plain meaning approach or textual interpreta-
tion at length often involve statutes rather than contracts. Statutes differ
of course because they are the positive law of the sovereign rather than
an agreement among persons or entities. Statutes are also inherently tex-
tual writings while contracts may be oral or written. Because statutes are
law applicable to the public and not mere agreements among contract-
ing parties, the stakes of statutory interpretation are perhaps considered
sufficiently higher and therefore worth more extensive reflection and dis-
cussion by courts. But even though statutes, particularly criminal statutes,
differ from contract documents, the basic ground rules of interpretation
should apply in all cases. Judicial analysis of statutory language can thus
illuminate what courts do - or at least say they do - in resolving disputes
over textual meaning.
Rodriguez, despite its methodical four-step process, does not tell the
reader much about how the judges of the en banc Fifth Circuit actu-
ally determined word meaning. But it does at least identify the sources
182. 711 F.3d at 544.
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of meaning consulted by the court. These include dictionaries,"' judicial
precedent, model laws, and treatises. For example in Rodriguez, the LaFave
& Scott criminal law treatise enjoyed status as an authority on word mean-
ing in criminal statutes.84
Defendant Rodriguez argued that the sentencing enhancement should
be based on the general national understanding of statutory rape and ille-
gal sex with a child (the Rodriguez encounter was apparently consensual),
which he argued was under age 16 and a four-year age difference between
victim and perpetrator. Therefore, argued Rodriguez, it would be inappro-
priate to increase his sentence based on violation of the harsher Texas state
law that applied to victims under 17 and requires only a three-year differ-
ence. (Rodriguez was 19 at the time of the infraction). The court rejected
this argument, finding the statutory language clear.
Taylor v. United States involved the question of whether burglary consti-
tuted a "crime of violence" for purposes of sentence enhancement, with the
Court taking the view that the term should be given its "generic" mean-
ing rather than the particular meaning of the state law pursuant to which
the defendant previously was convicted."' Based on this, the Fifth Circuit
prior to Rodriguez, took the view that "lower courts [should] always look
to the majority of state codes-as well as to other sources, including the
Model Penal Code, federal law, and criminal law treatises" when assessing
the "generic, contemporary meaning" of an offence category not specifi-
cally defined in federal criminal law.186
183. See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989); MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLE-
GIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003), WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d
ed. 2002); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), all cited in Rodriguez, 711 E3d at 559-61.
184. WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW (5th ed. 2010); see also WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN
SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW (1986) (cited in Supreme Court's United States v. Taylor
decision and several Fifth Circuit decisions regarding meaning of criminal statutes).
185. 495 U.S. at 598.
186. Rodriguez, 711 E3 dat 554; see, e.g., United States v. Santiesteban-Hernandez, 469 E3d
376, 379 (5th Cit. 2006); United States v. Munoz-Ortenza, 563 E3d 112, 114-15 (5th Cit.
2009); United States v. Lopez-DeLeon, 513 E3d 472, 474-75 (5th Cit. 2008); United States v.
Mendez-Casarez, 624 E3d 233, 239 (5th Cit. 2010). But these seemingly sensible approaches
to determining plain meaning "are no longer valid [Fifth Circuit] precedent to the extent
they use approaches other than a plain-meaning approach to define the "generic, contem-
porary meaning" of the "statutory rape" and "sexual abuse of a minor" offense categories" of
the sentencing guidelines. Rodriguez, 711 E3d at 548 n.6. Because of the unifying thread of
federal law and a U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the Fifth Circuit is not alone in adopting a
plain meaning approach to assessing sentence enhancement terminology. See, e.g., Londono-
Quintero, 289 E3d at 153-54 (using Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary to define
"sexual abuse of a minor"); United States v. Martinez-Carillo, 250 E3d 1101, 1104 (7th Cit.
2001) (using Black's Law Dictionary to define generic meaning of "sexual abuse of a minor");
United States v. Graham, 982 E2d 32155, 316 (8th Cit. 1992) (using Black's Law Dictionary
to define "dwelling" and "burglary of a dwelling"); United States v. Romerio-Hernandez,
505 E3d 1082, 1087-88 (10th Cit. 2007) (using Black's Law Dictionary to define "forcible sex
offense"); United States. v. Diaz-Ibarra, 522 E3d 343, 348-49 (4th Cit. 2008) (using Webster's
Third New International Dictionary to define "sexual abuse of a minor"); United States v. De
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In an insurance coverage matter, one court took that view that the plain
meaning approach:
means that a judicial interpretation should conform to the plain meaning that
reasonable insurers and insureds likely would have attributed to the words.
The search for this plain meaning does not myopically focus on a word
here or a phrase there. Instead, it looks at a word in the context of a sentence,
a sentence in the context of a paragraph, and a paragraph in the context of
the entire agreement. The plain meaning of a word depends not merely on
semantics and syntax but also on the holistic contact of the word within the
instrument. Consequently, every word, clause, and provision of the policy
'should be considered and construed together and seemingly conflicting pro-
visions harmonized when that can be reasonably done, so as to effectuate the
intention of the parties as expressed therein.' If policy terms] 'are clear and
unambiguous, their terms are to be taken in their plain, ordinary and popular
sense.'187
Jesus-Ventura, 565 E3d 870, 876-77 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (looking to definitions of terms in state
codes, the Model Penal Code, and federal law to determine meaning of "kidnapping"); United
States v. Marrero, 677 E3d 155, 165-66) (3d Cir. 2012) (using Model Penal Code, state laws,
and criminal law treatises to determine meaning of "murder"); United States v. McClenton,
54 E3d 584, 587 (3d Cir. 1995) (using dictionary definitions of "dwelling").
But, on closer scrutiny, these courts all use differing methodologies of determining plain
meaning despite the purported uniformity enhancing aspects of the plain meaning approach.
Arguably, insurance law makes uniformity more elusive in that insurance law is highly state-
centered and only seldom is subject to a controlling federal statute or court decision. The
leading federal statute on insurance, of course, is the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which might
better be termed a disunifying statute in that it commits insurance regulation and insurance
law generally to the states.
But a majority decision does not necessarily mean judicial consensus. Three judges in
Rodriguez concurred, stating that they were "perplexed" by the majority's "decision to rely
solely on dictionary definitions." First, these judges thought "that courts are just as capable as
the authors of dictionaries of determining how statutes 'usually' define 'minor."' Second, the
concurring judges saw "inconsistencies in how the court applies the dictionary definitions."
711 E3d at 563, 567 (Owen, J., joined by Haynes & Graves, JJ., concurring).
Another judge dissented, labeling the majority's plain meaning approach "novel" and
"unprecedented" by focusing on the meaning of terms such as "statutory rape" based on the
state law under which the defendant was previously convicted, rather than upon broader
national and historical connotations of a term. See 711 E3d at 574, (Dennis, J., concurring);
see also United States v. Rangel-Castaneda, 709 E3d 373 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding generic,
contemporary meaning of statutory rape to place age of consent at sixteen); United States v.
Rodriguez-Guzman, 506 E3d 738, 746 (9th Cir. 2007) (refusing to apply state law concept of
age of consent as eighteen).
187. Erie Ins. Exch. v. EPC MD 15, LLC, 822 S.E.2d 351, 355 (Va. 2019) (quoting Floyd
v. N. Neck Ins., 27 S.E.2d 193 (Va. 1993), and GEICO v. Moore, 580 S.E.2d 823 (Va. 2003))
(reversing, on the basis of policy language found clear, lower court finding that coverage was
extended to a policyholder's acquired entity); see also Kwiecinski v. Ill Farmers Ins. Co., 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11511, at *4-5 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 22, 2019) (U.S. Postal Service vehicle that
was driving on a daily mail delivery route for several years is a vehicle "furnished or available"
within the plain meaning of the policy); accord Smith v. Allstate Ins. Co., 681 N.E.2d 220,
222 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (employer-owned van provided for delivery of newspapers on route
was "furnished" for "regular use" as a matter of plain meaning); Estate of Kinser v. Ind. Ins.
Co., 950 N.E.2d 23, 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (vehicle furnished for regular use where delivery
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D. Labeling Problematic Policy Text Ambiguous Rather Than Applying More
Comprehensive Construction
In cases that are numerous but not obvious,"' courts decline to find a plain
meaning for language that many would regard as sufficiently clear to have
a plain meaning. In many if not the majority of jurisdictions, a finding of
textual ambiguity is a prerequisite to consideration of many types of con-
textual evidence (e.g., usage in trade, course of dealing, the nature of the
business or type of transaction involved, economic conditions, social con-
ditions) and especially what might be regarded as overt extrinsic evidence
(e.g., testimony or documents regarding party intent).
This prompts some courts to find ambiguity (or at least profess for find
ambiguity) in order to gain access to this additional information, particu-
larly in cases where enforcement of seemingly clear contract document
text cannot be avoided under the jurisdiction's prevailing law of uncon-
scionability, illegality, public policy or the "absurd result" exception to
enforcement of clear contract text.' Even when not required by law, a
court may be more comfortable declaring language ambiguous rather
than admitting that it has consulted extrinsic information and that this
information prompts the court not to give literal application of seemingly
clear policy text.
In a variant of this, a court may decline to give a broad reading to pol-
icy text because such a reading seems at odds with either a reading of the
policy as a whole or an understanding of what the policy is designed to
accomplish."' Related to this is some uncertainty about when arguably
straight-forward construction of policy text is (a) giving effect to a uni-
formly accepted understanding of the term or (b) engaging in diction-
ary hyper-literalism that gives the language a construction that may be
driver and employer had "mutual understanding that the driver would be given keys to access
and permission to drive the vehicle to make deliveries").
188. Some of the difficulty in finding illustrative cases may also result because courts are
deferring only partially to even clear text rather than being bound by the apparent single
meaning of text.
189. See, e.g., AstenJohnson, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 562 E.3 d 213,220-22 (3d Cir. 2009)
(before declaring result of literal reading of text absurd, court considered extrinsic evidence to
see if the information supported a non-absurd interpretation of policy language and, finding
none, invoked the absurd result concept); see id. at 222.
190. See, e.g., Groshong v. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 985 P.2d 1284, 1289-90 (Or. 1999)
(finding no personal injury coverage for housing discrimination claim; ruling that policy text
referring to coverage for claims alleging interference with "right of private occupancy" was
not clear on its face, but in context applied only to claims of infringement on rights of existing
property interests and not to claims of discriminatory failure to grant a property interest; see
also id. (stating that "[t]he meaning of a term is 'plain' that is, unambiguous if the term is
susceptible to only one plausible interpretation"). As part of its contextual analysis, the Gro-
shong court referred to Webster' Third New International Dictionary and conducted a functional
analysis, concluding that giving the phrase "right of private occupancy" a narrower meaning
than sought by the policyholder would not result in illusory coverage. See id. at 1288-90.
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technically correct but is at odds with the way in which most laypersons use
the language at issue in everyday speech.
A classic example of this definitional problem is application of the abso-
lute pollution exclusion to claims alleging chemically-related injury that
do not qualify as "pollution" as the term is commonly used. Is a court that
applies the exclusion to bar coverage for carbon monoxide poisoning from
a faulty furnace'91 giving the admittedly broad language of the exclusion
its "plain" meaning or engaging in over-literalism? When a court finds the
language ambiguous as applied to something like lead poisoning, the court
may claim that the language itself is unclear; but it might be more accurate
to say that the language is linguistically clear standing alone but inconsis-
tent with the intent, purpose, and function of the insurance policy once
other evidence of meaning is considered.92
In addition, to the extent that the policy language at issue is an exclusion
or operates in the nature of an exclusion, the "real" basis for a decision
adverse to an insurer may be that although the language is quite favor-
able to the insurer, the language is not so indubitably clear as to reach
the threshold of plain meaning-which the RLLI and most courts have
defined as a textual presentation admitting to only a single meaning-in
light of the canon of construction that exclusions are to be strictly con-
strued and the burden of persuasion placed on insurers to demonstrate
applicability of the exclusion.
E. The (Beneficial) Inconsistency of Courts Avoiding Arguably Clear Policy
Language Without Disavowing the Plain Meaning Approach
Notwithstanding that many courts may be more comfortable finding
textual ambiguity and considering contextual and extrinsic evidence in
order to resolve disputes over policy meaning, courts are in some circum-
stances quite willing to refuse application of seemingly clear text based on
191. Other examples include bat guano in an attic; drifting smoke that obscures vision
and leads to a collision; contaminated drinking water at a golf tournament; and a direct hit
by escaping fuel or insecticide that is confined to only one or a small group of victims in the
immediate vicinity. In these types of cases, the courts have divided on coverage as contrasted
with cases of claims based on wider, more gradual contamination affecting a relatively larger
group or area in which almost all courts have found the exclusion applicable.
192. Cases that place reliance on legislative intent in construing statutes illustrate this
reduced "deference light" to text. See, e.g., Baker v. Hedstrom, 309 P.3d 1047, 1050 (N.M.
2013) (stating that aim of statutory construction is to give effect to legislative intent, but
court is to use "the plain language of the statute as the primary indicator of legislative intent")
(quoting State v. Willie, 212 P.3d 369, 373 (N.M. 2009)). Contract and insurance coverage
cases use similar approaches in at least acknowledging that contracting is about an agreement,
but placing heavy reliance on text as the primary indicator of party intent. Because contracts
normally lack the extensive background information surrounding statutes, this normally
means that contract text prevails. Insurance is arguably a mix of the two in that widely used
policy terms function as a type of private legislation that has a discernable drafting history or
well-known purpose.
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consideration of other factors. This inconsistency is largely just and benefi-
cial in that in almost all of these instances, the result seems correct despite
the facial clarity of the text at issue, as reflected in the examples below.
In the situations addressed below, courts reach sound results because
they refuse to follow the literal language at issue. My question is why such
instances are not more greatly appreciated as essentially refuting the plain
meaning approach and arguing for a shift to more contextualized inter-
pretation along the lines of the R2K. Devotees of plain meaning have not
adequately answered the question. Although one must give at least muted
celebration of correct case outcomes, a more candidly logical, less text-
fixated approach to construction would merit louder cheers.
1. Anti-assignment Clauses
The case reports are strewn with decision that permit the policyholder to
assign policy protections after fortuitous loss has occurred if the insurer
faces no increase of hazard from policyholder's assignment of rights after
contingent risk has become a chose in action.' The anti-assignment
clause on its face, however, would appear to clearly forbid all assignments.
Although this could just as easily be viewed as an absurd result or an
unconscionable penalty creating disproportionate forfeiture in the event
of assignment, the majority rule on this point could also be viewed as judi-
cial rejection of clear text after examination of non-textual factors affecting
insurance policy construction. The result is correct as a matter of logic and
public policy, but clearly undermines the case for plain meaning literalism.
2. Rejecting Literal Application of Pollution Exclusion Text
Although the cases are divided, courts often refuse to give literal enforce-
ment to the absolute or total pollution exclusion in cases that do not
involve what ordinary folk would deem "pollution," such as carbon monox-
ide poisoning from a broken furnace or an adulterated drinking fountain.94
However, courts that refuse literal application of the pollution exclusion
text tend not to concede that these correct results are inconsistent with
a strong form of the plain meaning approach and instead declare the text
193. See, e.g., Wehr Constructors, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of Am., 384 S.W3d 680, 682-89
(Ky. 2012) (collecting cases on majority rule versus minority rule on this issue; using func-
tional and purposive analysis that finesses the issue of the clarity of the policy text); accord N.
River Ins. Co. v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 105 A.3d 369 (Del. 2014).
194. See, e.g., Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 1037,
1043 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying Illinois law) ("Without some limiting principle, the [text of]
the pollution exclusion clause would extend far beyond its intended scope, and lead to some
absurd results."); accord Kent Farms, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 998 P.2d 292, 296 (Wash. 2000)
(worker injured by spraying gas due to defective valve is not "polluted" as the exclusion was
intended to be understood); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 82 (Ill. 1997)
(carbon monoxide poisoning from defective heater is injury due to vendor negligence rather
than pollution).
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ambiguous rather than noting that such facially clear policy text is simply
inconsistent with the structure and function of the CGL policy, its pur-
pose, and the intent of the industry in adopting the exclusion.19
3. Earth Movement Exclusions
Earth movement exclusions, often with anti-concurrent causation clauses,
are a staple of property insurance policies and sometimes even found in
liability policies. If read literally, they could in many cases unfairly gut cov-
erage. As a result, many courts have read the exclusions as applying only
to natural earth movement such as mudslides and earthquakes and not to
earth movement created by human activity.
In such cases, the court refuses to read the exclusion literally or broadly,
particularly an anti-concurrent causation clause, and limits excluded events
to naturally occurring earth movement-such as an earthquake or mud-
slide rather than shifts in foundation due to broken pipe, equipment mis-
uses, or inadequate stabilization by contractors.196
4. Treatment of Retentions and Deductibles
Although not specific or particularly clear, policy language requiring a
self-insured retention or deductible of policyholders permits courts to
read such language as requiring that these funds be paid out of pocket by
policyholders as a condition precedent to coverage. But courts in these
cases have generally refused to accord such language a "plain meaning" in
favor of insurers.97 The often implicit rather than express rationale is that
195. See, e.g., Century Sur. Co. v. Casino W., Inc., 329 P.3d 614, 618 (Nev. 2014).
196. See Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 252 P.3d 668,672-74 (Nev. 2011) (collecting
cases and concluding majority rule is to hold standard language earth movement exclusion
applicable only to naturally caused earth movement despite its broad language but doing so
largely on grounds of textual ambiguity); United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Assurance Co. of Am., 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73630, at *13-15 (D. Nev. May 29, 2012) (taking similar approach to sub-
sidence exclusion in general liability policy; expressly finding exclusion ambiguous, but also
invoking reasonable expectations of builder policyholder and purpose of policy to provide
protection to builders sued if faulty work causes injury to other property).
197. See, e.g., Lasorte v. Certain Underwriters, 995 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1140 (D. Mont.
2014) (holding that self-insured retention (SIR) provided for in policy did not actually have
to be paid to trigger insurer duty to provide payment; it was sufficient that policyholder had
incurred liability in excess of SIR amount); Intervest Constr. of Jax, Inc. v. Gen. Fid. Ins.
Co., 133 So. 3d 494, 502-03 (Fla. 2014) (liability policy does not require SIR amount to be
satisfied by payments made by policyholder; payment of retention amount by other source
sufficient to obligate insurer to provide coverage). But see Lloyd's Syndicated No. 5820 v.
AGCO Corp., 756 S.E.2d 520,525 (Ga. 2014) (applying literal meaning of term "held legally
liable" as measuring stick for insurer's responsibility to pay claim and refusing to construe
term to trigger payment obligation merely because it had become apparent that policyholder
was going to be found liable to third-party claimant). Accord RLLI, supra note 1, § 1(2), (12)
("Unless otherwise stated in the insurance policy, none of the insurer's duties with respect to
defense or indemnification are contingent upon the insured's payment of the [deductible or
self-insured retention].").
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imposing this burden on most policyholders (i.e., those without sufficient
resources to pay out of pocket) would undermine the purpose of the policy.
Insurers are adequately protected so long as they can subtract a retention
or deductible from their obligation without "up front" payment from the
policyholder.
5. Use of a Motor Vehicle Provisions
In a win for automobile insurers, courts have tended not to read the "use
of a vehicle" language in auto policies as broadly as they could, reducing
the instances in which injuries taking place while the vehicle is stationary
(e.g., carjacking, loading or unloading, sleeping overnight) are within cov-
erage.98 Although these cases tend to narrow rather than expand coverage,
they fit a pattern of courts tending to refrain from broad literal notions of
what constitutes plain meaning.
"Use" of an auto is a broad term. If applied in a literal fashion (and per-
haps a plain meaning fashion as well), the bus driver with TB, the drive-by
shooting, unloading a trunk, and carbon monoxide poisoning from a defec-
tive heater would all qualify as auto "use" triggering coverage. But many
and perhaps even most cases take a narrower approach, effectively treating
these events as general liability exposures rather than auto exposures in
spite of the broad text standard auto policies.
The situation is complicated in many states by statutes affecting the
area, but I think it is correct to say that in these cases courts do not apply
facially clear textual meaning but instead consider a number of extrinsic
factors, including what they perceive to be the purpose of auto insurance as
opposed to other forms of insurance, to determine whether the incident in
question should be treated as an auto liability policy matter.
One may quarrel with some decisions that refuse to find "use" of a vehi-
cle where, as a practical matter, that finding leaves a policyholder without
a defense or a victim without compensation where the vehicle was conced-
edly a "but for" cause of loss (e.g., if the victim had not returned to the
car in the parking lot, she would not have been robbed). Consequently,
I would prefer that courts addressing use-of-vehicle issues take the addi-
tional step of acknowledging that, in order to reach what they regard as
good decisions consistent with the structure and function of auto policies,
they have backed away from the plain meaning approach and are making
the hard decision of where to confine cause in fact with a de facto concept
198. See, e.g., Lancer Ins. Co. v. Garcia Holiday Tours, 345 S.W.3d 50, 58 (Tex. 2011)
(claims by passengers for exposure to tuberculosis due to infected bus driver did not "result
from" use of motor vehicle); accord Imperium Ins. Co. v. Unigard Ins. Co., 16 E Supp. 3d 1104,
1122 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (liability for negligently unsecured gate across road did not arise out of
vehicle use even though vehicle was used by workers leaving gate unsecured).
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of proximate cause so that auto insurers are not required to cover risks bet-
ter suited to property, life, health, and disability insurance.
6. Declining Strict Enforcement of "Visible Marks" Requirements
Some of the classic reasonable expectations cases have involved burglary
claims where the insurer has refused coverage because of a lack of "vis-
ible marks of entry" and courts have refused to give the provision literal
application." Courts in these cases (and there are of course others to the
contrary) deviate from a plain meaning approach even though the visible
marks language has a purpose, albeit one the language does not further
very well.200
7. Narrow Construction of the Business Pursuits Exclusion
Most homeowners policies, which are by design sold to individuals, contain
an exclusion barring coverage for losses or claims arising out of business
activities conducted by the homeowner. The rationale for the limitation
is that commercial activity increases risk and should only be covered if
that risk is disclosed, underwritten by the carrier, and paid for by the poli-
cyholder through an increased premium or purchase of an endorsement.
Although there many cases applying the limitation, which is written in
rather broad language arguably implicating even a policyholder's episodic
care of a neighbor's dog or occasional babysitting for modest remunera-
tion, there are also cases implicitly rejecting or at least de-emphasizing the
text of the coverage limitation in favor of an assessment of whether the
activity giving rise to the loss or claim is actually inconsistent with the risk
assumed by the insurer selling a homeowners policy.20'
8. Refusing Literal Enforcement of Representations or Warranties
Representations or warranties are staples of property insurance and in
many cases are quite clear on their face (e.g., requiring a janitor or guard
on or occupying premises). Courts have on more than a few occasions con-
strued this type of rather clear, plain, absolute language not to bar coverage
where the janitor or guard makes a fast food run during which time theft
199. See, e.g., Atwater Creamery Co. v. W Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W2d 271 (Minn.
1985); C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
200. The purpose is to avoid coverage for "inside job" burglaries, the rationale being that
an inside job is less likely to produce visible marks of forced entry a rationale undermined
by a policyholder thief who has the minimal cleverness required to break a window or pry
open a door after using insider status to steal policyholder property that will be the subject
of the claim.
201. See, e.g., Springer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 94 A.3d 75, 87-91 (Md. 2014) (business pur-
suits exclusion to liability coverage component of homeowner's insurance policy is construed
to mean something other than mere minimum commercial activity or activity for which
compensation is received; exclusion applies only where there is a continuity of the insured's
alleged business interests and a profit motive).
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takes place or a fire breaks out,202 or when differently named parts serve the
same function as a warranted component.203 These cases, although gener-
ally good decisions from a public policy perspective, are inconsistent with
the professed "plain meaning" law of many states, a conflict that should
spur some rethinking of legal system's professed admiration of plain mean-
ing jurisprudence.
9. Refusing Strict Enforcement of Time Limit Conditions
This is seen primarily in accident or health policies where medical neces-
sity or disability may be defined in terms of concrete physical symptoms or
treatment within a proscribed period of time. Modern courts have tended
not to enforce these provisions literally even if typically professing support
for plain meaning analysis.204
VIII. CONCLUSION
What exactly, then, is "plain" meaning? Everyone appears to agree on the
basic contours of the concept in general, including contextualists, who typ-
ically privilege the text of insurance policies and other contract documents
over other indicia of meaning. But there is pronounced division within
the legal community as to the nature, extent, and purpose of non-textual
information that may be used to determine whether a term has more than
one reasonable reading.205 While there tends to be steady debate regarding
202. See Vlastos v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 707 E2d 775 (3d Cir. 1983) (war-
ranty providing that third floor of insured building would be occupied as janitor residence
satisfied when janitor was living in building but off-premises during time theft took place)
(applying Pennsylvania law).
203. See Gold Mine Invs., Inc. v. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 300 P.3d 1113, 1118 (Kan.
Ct. App. 2013) (finding that use of fuses satisfies clause requiring circuit breakers because this
is the reading that a reasonable policyholder would give the policy text). But, even without
hyper-literalism, it would seem clear that a circuit breaker is not a fuse. The court's emphasis
is on functional analysis, risks presented, and objectively reasonable expectations. But the
court could have reached this result by acknowledging that the text appeared to have a plain
meaning of requiring circuit breakers, but that application of this meaning would be inappro-
priate in light of the extrinsic evidence of policy purpose and objectives. Once again, however,
we have a first-party illustration, rather than a liability insurance illustration.
204. See, e.g., Strickland v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 242 S.E.2d 148, 152 (Ga. 1978) (reversing
literal application of 90-day requirement for amputation and remanding for consideration of
functional analysis and consideration of public policy). However, this more functional and
purposive approach may be the minority rule. See, e.g., Martin v. Allianz Life Ins. Co., 573
N.W.2d 823, 827-28 (N.D. 1998) (in requiring severance of limb within ninety days for cov-
erage, court reviews caselaw and finds its approach to be clear majority with cases like Strick-
land as a distinct minority); see also Hawes v. Kan. Farm Bureau, 710 P.2d 1312, 1316-17 (Kan.
1985) (collecting cases).
205. Significant elements of the legal community favor substantial modification of the
traditional contract model, at least as respects insurance policies. The most obvious is sup-
port for a strong version of the reasonable expectations approach to policy construction in
which a policyholders objectively reasonable expectations determine contract meaning even
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the boundaries of acceptable consideration of material outside documen-
tary text, the core issue of what constitutes a sufficiently plain, clear, or
unambiguous text continues to receive relatively little attention, perhaps
because it is insoluble. This undermines the rationale for the supremacy of
the plain meaning approach and argues powerfully for regular judicial use
of a broader contextualist approach statute, contract, nd policy construc-
tion that is more receptive to non-textual indicia of meaning.
The perhaps uninspiring answer to the question of what constitutes
plain meaning seems to be: whatever convinces the judge that the text is
sufficiently understandable that further inquiry is unnecessary or unlikely
to be worth the temporal, economic, social, or doctrinal cost. Contract
meaning is plain when the judge is satisfied that it is clear-a determina-
tion that varies not only with the background, orientation, and linguistic
preferences of the individual judge but also according to contextual factors
and extrinsic evidence that is often unacknowledged.
Although trial judges making such a determination are affirmed more
often than not, their findings of inarguably "plain" meaning as a matter of
if contradicted by the literal language of the policy. See STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 64,
§ 4.11; Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 961 (1970) (Part I). In practice, however, nearly all jurisdictions at least purport to
require a showing of textual ambiguity before considering policyholder expectations as a
guide to word meaning. See RANDY MANILOFF & JEFFREY STEMPEL, GENERAL LIABILITY INSUR-
ANCE COVERAGE: KEY ISSUES IN EVERY STATE, ch. 22 (3d ed. 2015). Because court decisions
involving the reasonable expectations concept are so interwoven with the dispute in question
rather than a broad state "rule" on reasonable expectations, the authors of the treatise elected
to eliminate this chapter in the fourth edition of the treatise.
In addition, some support exists for viewing insurance policies as products and assess-
ing them in light of their performance and fitness for the ostensible purpose rather than
focusing on text alone. See, e.g., Christopher C. French, Understanding Insurance Policies as
Non-Contracts: An Alternative Approach to Drafting and Construing These Unique Financial
Instruments, 89 TEMPLE L. REV. 535 (2017); Stempel, supra note 64; Daniel Schwarcz, A
Product Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Coverage, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1389 (2007). There is also some support (but likely less support) for viewing insurance
policies as social instruments, see Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument
and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489 (2010), or akin to legislation, see Jeffrey
W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Statute, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 203 (2010)).
This is in addition to a rather large block of the academic community that, although adher-
ing to a contract model of insurance policies, would prefer to de-emphasize textualism and
increase contextualism beyond that approved in the second Contracts Restatement. See, e.g.,
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Contract Interpretation 2.0: Not Winner-Take-All but Best-Tool-for-
the-Job, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1625 (2018) (arguing for avoidance of fundamentalist textualist
approach and advocating more eclectic approach to contract construction); James A. Fischer,
Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation? Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 995 (1992) (supporting contextualist approach and finding it more prevalent in case-
law than commonly thought in view of judicial rhetoric supporting textual focus); Jeffrey W.
Stempel & Erik S. Knutsen, Rejecting Word Worship: Integrative Interpretation to Improve Judicial
Construction of Insurance Policies, 90 U. CINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (same regarding
insurance policies); see also William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130
HARV. L. REV. 1079 (2017) (taking less eclectic view more cabined by text but recognizing sub-
stantial non-textual factors operating widely in contract and statutory interpretation cases).
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law are reversed with sufficient frequency (somewhere between a quarter
and a third of the time in contract disputes challenged before an appel-
late court, depending how one characterizes and counts)206 that one can be
forgiven for questioning the cosmic correctness of a court's determination
that the meaning of a contract term is inarguably clear.20
And there remains the core problem of the plain meaning approach: its
intellectual incoherence.
On its surface, the rule has an intuitive appeal. It seems like a safe inter-
mediate position between strict textualism (which resists acknowledg-
ing ambiguity, admits no absurd result exception and limits or even bars
recourse to extrinsic evidence even in cases of ambiguity) and some form
of all-things-considered eclecticism or pragmatism. But if we poke below
the surface, we ought to see that the basic structure of the plain meaning
rule is quite puzzling. In our normal lives, and in most contexts under the
rules of evidence, information is either useful or not: "Information that is
relevant shouldn't normally become irrelevant just because the text is clear.
And vice versa, irrelevant information shouldn't become useful just because
the text is less than clear."208
Seen in this light, the RLLI version of plain meaning might be described
as a fusion of the New York and California approaches as well as a reflec-
tion of what courts are "really" doing in contract cases. Recall that Section
3 of the RLLI defines the plain meaning of an insurance policy term as "the
single meaning to which the term is reasonably susceptible when applied to
facts of the claim at issue in the context of the entire insurance policy,"209 a
definition consistent with that of courts and treatise writers as well as with
principle that contract terms should not be assessed in isolation and that
206. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Taking Cognitive Illiberalism Seriously: Judicial Humility, Aggre-
gate Efficiency, andAcceptable justice, 43 LOYOLA L.J. 627 (2012) (noting that roughly a third of
summary judgments appealed result in partial reversal or remand, undermining the efficiency
claims of summary judgment).
207. In addition, any single individual's conclusion that contract text is clear maybe under-
mined by "false consensus bias," the tendency of human beings to believe that everyone would
agree with their assessment of the "natural," "obvious," or "clear" meaning of a term. See
Lawrence M. Solan et al., False Consensus Bias in Contract Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1268 (2008).
208. William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI.
L. REV. 539, 540 (2017) (providing extensive criticism of plain meaning approach even if
not applied in rigidly hyper-textualist manner and finding criticisms applicable to contract
construction as well as statutory interpretation); id. at 564 (positing that judicial reaction to
extrinsic evidence such as a committee report is as predictable and cabined as judicial reaction
to language); see also Bishop, supra note 150, at 857-60 (defending plain meaning concept in
part but conceding that may be inapt in many cases). In light of the malleability of language
and differing reader perceptions, one might also amend the Baude & Doerfler quote to sub-
stitute "appears superficially clear" for "is clear."
209. See RLLI, supra note 1, § 3(2). Pursuant o RLLI § 3(1), "If the insurance policy term
has a plain meaning when applied to the facts of the claim at issue, the term is interpreted
according to that meaning."
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contracts should be read as a whole, an approach that inherently encour-
ages some appreciation of the basic setting and purpose of the transaction
at issue.
As noted in the Reporter's Note to Section 3 of the RLLI: "the dif-
ference between the [RLLI] plain-meaning approach and the contextual
approach lies, not in the consideration of context altogether, but rather in
the extent of the context that is considered. [RLLI § 3] allows the court
to consider the policy, the purpose of the policy, dictionaries, primary
and secondary legal authorities and trade usage."210 While, this approach
may leave both textualists and contextualists dissatisfied, it is a workable if
imperfect approach.2 '
Section 3 labels a term "ambiguous" if the term "does not have a plain
meaning" and refers readers to Section 4, which states the widely accepted
contra proferentem approach. If there is more than a "single meaning to
which the language of the term is reasonably susceptible when applied to the
facts of the claim at issue in the context of the entire insurance policy,"212 the term
is by definition not plain and subject to Section 4, which permits consid-
eration of a wide range of information bearing on contract meaning, with
construction against the contract drafter held in reserve as a tie breaker in
the event meaning remains uncertain after analysis of non-textual indicia
of meaning.2 3
Although the RLLI states that it is rejecting the contextual approach
of the R2K, an observer might be forgiven for thinking that the ALI pro-
tests too much.21 4 Although the RLLI does not embrace a full-throated
210. RLLI, supra note 1, § 3, Reporters' Note (a) (citing with approval MALCOLM A. CLARKE,
THE LAw OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 15-3, at 419 (4th ed. 2002) ("The ordinary meaning of
words is the meaning when read not in isolation but in contexts. The context is a series of
circles: the phrase, the sentence, the paragraph, the part of the policy, the whole of the policy,
and then, outside the policy itself, the past dealing of the parties, the trade context, and the
objects which the policy was intended to achieve.")).
211. My continuing objection to RLLI § 3 is that, if construed narrowly, it is too resistant
to potentially illuminating information such as the origin, background, objective, develop-
ment, drafting history, and deployment of policy language. For example, in current disputes
over COVID-19 coverage, insurers have opposed discovery of ISO personnel and materials
concerning these aspects of the widely used virus exclusion and may be able to successfully
invoke Section 3 in these efforts, which would be unfortunate. Background information about
the genesis of the exclusion is of course relevant to its construction as well as industry under-
standing of the scope of coverage in policies that do not contain the exclusion.
212. See RLLI, supra note 1, § 3(2) (emphasis added).
213. See id. §4.
214. See WILLIAM. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act III, sc. II (originating the now-accepted say-
ing to describe situation in which one makes representations inconsistent with or out of pro-
portion to conduct, which correspondingly suggestions insincerity). The term "protest" in
Shakespeare's time, generally meant to declare solemnly or to vow rather than the more mod-
ern usage of protest as implying dissent or visible disagreement. Labelling RLLI § 3 insincere
would be unfair and inaccurate but it is fair to note that, notwithstanding its embrace of
plain meaning nomenclature, RLLI § 3 does not endorse a narrow, crabbed, or unduly literal
reading of policy text in a vacuum.
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contextual approach in the manner of Corbin or Farnworth, neither is it
taking a narrow textualist view in the manner of Justice Scalia addressing
statutory language. The black letter of Section 3 itself nods significantly to
context, stressing the "claim at issue" and the "context of the entire" policy
as well adopting a lower threshold for finding ambiguity than many courts
("reasonable susceptibility" of language to more than one meaning rather
than facial ambiguity, patent ambiguity, or the like).
The Comments and Reporters' Note to RLLI Section 3 makes its semi-
contextual approach more apparent. Courts following the RLLI method
may consider as "generally accepted sources of plain meaning" dictionaries,
court decisions, statutes, regulations, treatises, law review articles and other
secondary authority. The RLLI regards these not as extrinsic evidence but
as "legal authorities that courts consult when determining the plain mean-
ing of an insurance policy term, which is a legal question,"2 " as is contract
construction generally. In addition, Section 3 makes an ample place at the
table for custom, practice, and usage, expressly approving introduction of
expert affidavits and testimony (via deposition if not at trial or before a
jury),2 16 which begins to look a lot like extrinsic evidence. However, the
RLLI draws a line excluding "extrinsic evidence such as drafting history,
course of dealing, or precontractual negotiations"2 unless the text as issue
is deemed ambiguous.
Notwithstanding these limitations, textualists-and many elements of
the insurance industry-are upset with Section 3. Entities with the bargain-
ing power to draft contract documents and who think (perhaps mistakenly,
probably mistakenly?) that they can do this consistently well and obtain
absolute textual advantage will naturally be resistant to consideration of
any information that might undermine their efforts or reduce these advan-
tages. They become zealots for strict textualism, conveniently forgetting
that when it is to their advantage, they are happy to seek the benefit of
implied terms, the overall purpose of the instrument, public policy, and
perhaps other extrinsic evidence as well.21
215. RLLI§ 3, supra note 1, cmt. b.
216. Id. § 3, cmt c.
217. Id. (but also emphasizing that the "facts of the claim," although extrinsic to the policy
text, are not extrinsic evidence as the term is generally understood or should be understood.).
218. Insurer reliance on non-textual arguments about the design, purpose, intent, and
function of insurance underly coverage defenses based on lack of fortuity, public policy pro-
hibitions on coverage for punitive damages, and noncoverage of claims that sound more
in restitution than damages. Even the insurance industry's thus far successful campaign to
avoid coverage for COVID-19 business interruption claims regarding policies lacking a virus
exclusion makes considerable use of non-textual argument along with contentions that policy
terms such as "physical loss" and "physical damage" have a plain meaning. The dictionary
definitions of these words are clearly broad enough to impose coverage, but insurers have
argued both in court and in the arena of public relations that the business income component
What Is the Meaning of "Plain Meaning"?
Policyholders and their allies are at least equally justified in complain-
ing about Section 3 in that it not only embraces the nomenclature and
ideology of plain meaning but also places limits on consideration of proba-
tive non-textual indicia of meaning such as drafting history. Section 3 also
gives short shrift to the reasonable expectations doctrine,19 to say nothing
of interpretative perspectives informed by the insurance policy's role as a
product, private legislation, part of a regulated industry, governance, or a
socioeconomic instrument.220
But love it or hate it, the RLLI does as good a job as any authority of
capturing the approach actually applied by most courts when interpreting
contract and insurance policy text. Although professing to privilege party
intent, the focus of the court is on documentary text out of a professed
belief that the parties' intent is best reflected in that text-so much so that
courts are wary (particularly if the parol evidence rule applies) of consider-
ing non-textual evidence unless the text is sufficiently unclear.
Even strongly textual courts implicitly surround their hermeneutic
endeavors with at least some context, typically using at minimum the
of property insurance was never intended to cover losses occasioned by infectious disease
and is outside the scope and purpose of such insurance, and that the industry would suffer
disastrous consequences if coverage is required. See Erik S. Knutsen & Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Infected Judgment: Creating Conventional Wisdom and Insurance Coverage Denial in a Pandemic,
27 CONN. INS. L.J. 185 (2021).
219. Perhaps calling it "short shrift" is a bit unfair:
The rules stated in this Section and in § 4 are broadly consistent with the princi-
ple that insurance policy terms are to be interpreted according to the reasonable
expectations of the insured, provided that the understanding of what makes an
expectation "reasonable" incorporates the concept of plain meaning. The term
"reasonable expectations" is not used in the black letter of this or other Sections
because of the wide variation in a way that courts have employed the term. By
requiring that the meaning be one to which the words are reasonably suscep-
tible, this Restatement does not follow the strong formulation of the reasonable-
expectations doctrine, pursuant to which an insurance policy is to be interpreted
according to the reasonable expectations of the insured even if the insurance
policy language is to the contrary. So stated, the reasonable-expectations doc-
trine is not actually a rule of interpretation. Rather, it is a rule regarding the
enforceability of terms that are inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of
the insured . . . the enforceability of insurance policy terms is governed by legal
rules other than those regarding interpretation.
RLLI, supra note 1, § 3, cmt. h.
220. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2013)
(noting that, in addition to contract and product perspectives, insurance can be analogies to
regulated industry because of similarity of insurance, which is highly regulated regarding
reserves, financial strength, policy forms, and pricing to utilities or other regulated indus-
tries; also noting insurance as a regulator or instrument of governance, which has similari-
ties to insurance policies as statutes and as social instruments); see also RICHARD ERICHSON
ET AL., INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE (2004) (noting degree to which availability of insurance
and conditions regarding insurance impact social and economic behavior); Aviva Abramovsky,
Reinsurance: The Silent Regulator 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 345 (2009) (same regarding reinsurance).
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factual setting of the case, the type of policy at issue (e.g., general liability,
D&O, commercial property), dictionaries, precedent, and legal commen-
tary, and perhaps custom and practice.
Likewise, strongly contextualist courts place strong emphasis on con-
tract/policy text as determinative of meaning. Although these courts may
be more receptive to extra-textual information than others, it requires very
probative extra-textual evidence of meaning to displace the court's imme-
diate reaction upon simply reading the text.
The resulting blend of eclectic interpretation may thus be the de facto
approach to judicial decision-making notwithstanding the rhetorical claims
of the courts. Although the meaning of plain meaning remains elusive, the
approach may in practice be considerably less strictly textually rigid than
its proponents assert.
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APPENDIX Am21
STATUTE(S) Setting Forth the Manner in Which





California Cal. Civ. Code § 1635 et seq.
Colorado None
Connecticut None
Delaware Del. Code Ann. tit. 10 § 5403
Florida None
Georgia Ga. Code. Ann. §§ 13-2-1 to 13-2-4
Hawaii None
Idaho Idaho Code § 29-109
Illinois None
Indiana None
Iowa Iowa Code Ann. § 622.22
Kansas None
Kentucky None








Montana Mont. Code Ann. §§ 28-3-101 to 28-3-704
Nebraska Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1217
221. This Appendix is limited to state statutes expressly governing contract interpretation.
More common are provisions pertaining to interpretation of statutes. See Jacob Scott, Codified
Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341,411 (2010) (Appendix); Nicho-
las Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2089
n.10 (2002) (collecting state laws).
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STATUTE(S) Setting Forth the Manner in Which







North Dakota N.D. Cent. Code §§ 9-07-01 to 9-07-23 and § 1-02-02
Ohio None
Oklahoma Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 151 to 178






Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-50-112(a)
Texas Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(a)-(b)
Utah None
Vermont None
Virginia None
Washington None
West Virginia None
Wisconsin None
Wyoming None
